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This dissertation studies two features of high-value auctions that are not ex-
plicitly captured by the standard models in the auction theory literature. The first
is that bidders in auctions for valuable assets sometimes have binding budget con-
straints. Standard models of auctions assume that bidders can submit any bid up to
their valuation (or willingness to pay). An existing literature has developed models
where bidders may face binding budget constraints and from these models has con-
cluded that the presence of budget constraints has important implications for the
relative performance of different auction formats, and as a consequence argues that
the presence of budget constraints should be an important factor used in choosing
an auction format.
Chapters 2 and 3 develop and study a model of budget constraints where the
budget constraint is chosen explicitly in the model in response to a principal-agent
problem between each bidder and a corresponding principal. In previous literature,
the budget constraint is assumed to be given by some exogenous procedure, and
hence is not affected by changes in the auction rules. The model presented here,
however, allows the choice of budget constraint to depend on the auction rules, and
the main result of Chapter 2 shows that allowing for this effect leads to outcomes
that closely resemble the classic results from the auction literature without budget
constraints.
Chapter 3 investigates the theoretical predictions of Chapter 2 in an exper-
iment involving undergraduate students at the University of Maryland. The ex-
periment is designed to evaluate the decisions made by the subjects acting as the
person responsible for deciding on a budget for the bidder. We perform treatments
where the bidding behavior is simulated by computerized agents and ones where
half the subjects in each session play the role of the bidder. Our results indicate
that the subjects take the auction rules into account when deciding on their respec-
tive bidder’s budget, and the direction of the response in the data agrees with the
theoretical predictions.
Chapter 4 studies a separate feature of high-value auctions that is not captured
by the standard auction models. That is, the bidders in the auction may have
valuations for the auctioned item that depend on the the identities of the other
winning bidders. If the auction determines the structure of the market the bidders
will compete in after the auction, the bidders’ values for the items will be affected
by who participates in that market. The typical notion of efficiency in the auction
literature corresponds to maximization of producer surplus in this model, but the
auctioneer may also be concerned with total surplus in this environment. The main
results show that these two notions of efficiency do not agree in this model, and
that a sequential auction favors maximization of producer surplus, while a sealed-
bid auction can favor maximization of total surplus. The key distinction between
the two is that the sequential auction is assumed to reveal the identity of early
winners to the later winners, while the sealed-bid auction reveals no information to
the participants until the auction concludes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
An important reason for the success and appeal of auction theory is that
the rules for bidding in auctions can faithfully be represented in a formal game
theoretic model. This is in contrast to other applications of game theory to economic
problems, where representing the environment in a formal economic model often
involves non-trivial assumptions about the consequences of the players’ actions.
Yet, standard auction models do make assumptions about the environment in an
auction that may be violated in practice. The importance of these deviations from
the standard auction models is the subject of much of the auction literature, and
this dissertation is a contribution to that literature.
The goal of this dissertation is to examine two important departures from the
standard models. Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with the possibility that bidders in
an auction may not be able to submit a bid of any amount due to budget constraints.
Standard auction models typically assume that bidders may submit any positive bid
amount to the auctioneer, but it has been reported in the literature that bidders
in auctions for valuable assets are often constrained [Cramton, 1995, Salant, 1997,
Bulow et al., 2009].
Chapter 4 examines a model where bidders’ valuations for the auctioned goods
depend on private information available to the bidder and the identity of the other
winners at the auction. This is a case where the valuations of the bidders exhibit
allocative externalities and is likely a feature of auctions when the outcome affects
the nature of competition between the bidders in some market.
Both budget constraints and allocative externalities are most likely present
in auctions for valuable assets. The size of the transaction means that bidders are
more likely to have their funding constrained either by their own firm or by external
credit markets, and the fact that the firms are typically purchasing the assets for
use in some market means that they are likely concerned with the ramifications the
auction outcome might have for the competitive structure of these markets.
In the sections that follow, I give a brief overview of the motivation for each
chapter and summarize the results.
1.1 Budget Constraints
In the existing literature on the effect of budget constraints on auction out-
comes, budget constraints are cited as an important deviation from standard models
because it is shown that incorporating budget constraints into otherwise standard
models invalidates classic results, such as revenue equivalence [Myerson, 1981, Ri-
ley and Samuelson, 1981] between the first- and second-price auction formats [Che
and Gale, 1998]. It is argued further that in the presence of budget constraints
sellers should prefer atypical auction formats, because these formats would raise
more money for the seller and improve the auction’s efficiency [Che and Gale, 1996,
Maskin, 2000, Pai and Vohra, 2008].
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The existing models for budget constraints, however, generally assume that
the distribution of budget constraints is determined exogenously, and is not affected
by a change in the auction rules. Since many explanations for the existence of
budget constraints in the literature suggest that they may be the result of an agency
problem between the bidder and some third party, one could ask whether modeling
the budget constraint as an explicit choice would change the results from the budget
constraints literature. This is the question that is addressed by Chapter 2 of this
dissertation.
The results in Chapter 2 show that by explicitly modeling the choice of a
budget for each bidder prior to the auction, one can restore many of the results from
the literature on auctions without budget constraints, such as revenue equivalence.
The reasoning behind these results is simple. The players in the model who are
responsible for setting the budgets (the principals) incorporate the consequences of
a change in auction rules into their decision. Under the right conditions, this has
the effect of completely canceling out any effect the change in auction rules might
have on the outcome.
In Chapter 3, we provide experimental evidence for the primary conclusion
drawn in Chapter 2, that the principals adjust their behavior to a change in the
auction rules. In sessions at the Experimental Economics Lab at the University of
Maryland involving undergraduate students, we conducted four separate treatments
to test the basic predictions of the theory. In two treatments, subjects played the
role of the principals, setting budgets for their computerized bidders in the first-
and second-price auctions. In the other two treatments, half the subjects played the
3
role of principals and half the subjects played the role of bidders in both the first-
and second-price auctions.
The results of the experiment show that the principals react to the auction
rules by setting significantly higher budgets in the second-price auction compared
to the first-price auction. This is the most basic prediction of the theory developed
in Chapter 2. We find that this result is supported by the data whether the role of
the bidders is played by computerized subjects or human subjects. A more detailed
prediction of the theory is that a bidder with a given value for the good should be
constrained with the same probability in both auction formats. We show support for
this prediction in the treatments with computerized bidders. In the treatments with
human bidders, testing this hypothesis would require making strong assumptions
about the intentions of the bidders when they are constrained.
1.2 Allocative Externalities
Chapter 4 of the dissertation studies a model where the bidders’ payoffs are
affected by the identity of the other winners. When the outcome of an auction
determines the structure of some market, it is likely that the bidders’ payoffs will
be affected by the identities of the winners. For example, a bidder may value one
unit of a good differently depending on whether or not a direct competitor wins the
other unit.
In auctions with externalities such as these it is generally not possible for the
seller to allocate the goods efficiently [Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001], but Das Varma
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[2002b] argues that if the seller can reveal the identities of the opposing bidders she
can improve the performance of the auction, both in terms of efficiency and revenue.
However, in this environment there are alternative ways to think about efficiency,
because one may define efficiency in terms of the surplus in the resulting market.
For example, one may also be concerned about the consumer surplus generated by
the downstream market. Chapter 4 develops a model that distinguishes between
two notions of efficiency and shows that the sequential auction (or an auction that
reveals the identities of winning bidders as the auction progresses) favors one but
not the other.
This chapter is also connected to the literature in Industrial Organization on
the incentives for a monopolist to deter entry. It has been argued in this literature
that sequentially auctioning resources instead of auctioning them all at once reduces
a monopolist’s incentives to deter entry and hence can lead to more competitive
market structures [Krishna, 1993]; however, more recent work has qualified this
result somewhat, showing that the results depend on assumptions about the relative
size of the competitors [Gale and Stegeman, 2001]. Although Chapter 4 is more
focused on efficiency than market structure, the results do support the idea that
sequential auctions may lead to less competitive market structures.
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2. ENDOGENOUS BUDGET CONSTRAINTS IN AUCTIONS
by Justin E. Burkett
2.1 Introduction
Bidders likely face budget constraints in many real-world auctions, especially
in the sale of valuable assets such as wireless spectrum [Cramton, 1995, Salant, 1997,
Bulow et al., 2009], and these constraints potentially have important strategic effects
on the outcomes of auction models that cannot be captured in standard frameworks.
Current literature on the subject [most notably Che and Gale, 1998] argues
that incorporating budget constraints into the standard independent private values
model invalidates some well-known results like the revenue equivalence theorem [Ri-
ley and Samuelson, 1981, Myerson, 1981]. For example, in a model where bidders
valuations are private and i.i.d. Che and Gale [1998] show that the first-price auc-
tion both raises more revenue and is more efficient than the second-price auction
with budget constraints. Further work extends these results to show that the all-pay
auction dominates the first-price auction in terms of revenue and efficiency [e.g., Che
and Gale, 1996, Maskin, 2000, Pai and Vohra, 2008].
The earlier literature offers various explanations for the underlying cause of
the budget constraints, including imperfect capital markets and agency problems
[Che and Gale, 1998]. However, these papers derive their results from models where
the budget constraint is treated as an exogenous random variable.1 A potential
advantage of this approach is that it allows one to be agnostic about the source of the
budget constraints and focus on the strategic effects introduced by the constraints,
but it ignores the possibility that the process generating the budget constraints may
be affected by a change in auction rules.2
If one tries to describe explicitly an agency problem that generates budget
constraints for the bidders, it seems that a description of the auction rules should
be included as well. Otherwise, one would have to assume that the parties funding
the auction take no interest in the auction design. Explicitly including a description
of the auction rules in the agency problem would allow the budget to vary according
to the rules, an effect that cannot adequately be captured in a model that treats the
budget constraints as a primitive. The purpose of this paper is to explore how bud-
get constraints might vary between different auction formats when the mechanism
generating the budget constraint is made explicit.
I develop a model where the bidder’s budget constraint is the endogenous
result of an agency problem between the bidder and a principal responsible for
funding the bidder’s bid. Results from the model suggest that budget constraints
1 The bidders’ types are two-dimensional, including a valuation and a budget, distributed ac-
cording to some commonly known prior distribution.
2 Strictly speaking, the distribution of the budget constraints could be specified differently for
each auction format, but without an explicit description of the mechanism generating the budget
constraint it is not clear how to do this.
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do not invalidate the standard results from the auction literature when they are
treated as endogenous choices. For example, when I restrict attention to the case
of independent signals between bidders, I find no difference in the expected revenue
or efficiency between the first- and second-price auctions. Although a special case,
the independence case corresponds to much of the existing literature on budget
constraints.
In the more general case where bidders’ information is allowed to be affiliated I
characterize symmetric, equilibrium strategies for the bidders and principals. I also
partially characterize the relative performance of the first- and second-price auc-
tions, showing that the first-price auction must be more efficient. Under affiliation
the principal prefers the first-price auction to the second-price auction and reacts
by relaxing the budget constraint. The effect on revenue is less clear due to the
complicated nature of the model and two counteracting effects. However, I am able
to solve for the equilibrium in an example and show that the expected revenue in
that case is higher in the second-price auction. This agrees with the revenue ranking
from classic symmetric, affiliated values model [Milgrom and Weber, 1982].
Motivated by existing explanations for the existence of budget constraints, I
model the budget constraint as the outcome of a principal-agent problem between
the bidder and some principal responsible for funding the bidder’s bid. I believe
that this basic setup covers many possible explanations for the origin of budget
constraints. For example, there is a large corporate finance literature suggesting
that capital market imperfections are the results of agency problems [Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997].
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The details of the model are easily summarized by the following situation. An
item is auctioned to one of N firms. Within each firm there is a manager interested
in purchasing the asset, but the manager must get funding approval from the firm’s
board of directors.3 An agency problem arises because the board of directors knows
that the manager will tend to overpay for the asset relative to its true value to the
firm because the manager has an empire-building motive or simply receives some
private payoff from managing the asset.4
Both the manager and the board observe signals about the value of the asset to
the firm upon which they base their choices. The board observes its signal first and
decides on a budget for the auction, after which the manager observes an additional
signal and decides on a bid to place at the auction that is consistent with the budget
constraints.
I consider versions of the model with “hard” and “soft” budget constraints.
In the hard budget constraint case, the budget is a fixed value which the bid may
never exceed. In the soft budget constraint case the board is able to provide a price
list to the manager for bids of different sizes.5 The hard budget constraint case is
more common in the existing literature, so I will primarily focus on this case here
3 Throughout the paper I use the convention that the manager is male and the representative
of the board is female.
4 A modern reference for this description of managerial motives is Jensen [1986], but the idea
can be traced back as far as Schumpeter [1934].
5 In other words, the bidder is allowed to submit a bid of any size but must incur a cost of c(b)
to submit the bid, so that in the event that he wins the item he receives v − c(b), where v is his
valuation.
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(Sections 2.4 and 2.5). It also may be the appropriate model if we impose a limited
liability condition on the principal, rendering schemes that require the bidder to pay
a fee to the principal infeasible. With soft budget constraints the principal is able
to perfectly manipulate the bidder’s objective and incentivize the bidder to behave
exactly as the principal would given the same information (Section 2.6). One may
interpret these two alternatives as representing two extreme descriptions of the form
of a budget constraint. Cramton [1995] suggests that in practice budget constraints
fall somewhere in between the two (i.e., they take the form of step functions).
2.2 Related Literature
Following early work on the effect of budget constraints on auction outcomes
when valuations are known [Che and Gale, 1996], Che and Gale [1998] are the first
to compare revenue between auction formats when both budgets and valuations are
treated as private information. A further extension of this work is given in Che
and Gale [2006] which develops techniques for comparing revenues between auction
formats when types are multidimensional and independent. Several papers [Fang
and Perreiras, 2002, 2003, Kotowski, 2010, Kotowski and Li, 2011] extend the model
of Che and Gale [1998] to allow for valuations to be affiliated, but they retain the
assumption that the bidders budgets are determined exogenously. Another direction
of research has examined the effect of exogenous budget constraints on auctions of
multiple goods [Brusco and Lopomo, 2008, Hafalir et al., 2012].
Several related papers make the financing decision endogenous in an auction.
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Benoit and Krishna [2001] consider a multiple-object auction setup in complete
information where bidders are allowed to choose their own budgets (at zero marginal
cost). They show that at least one bidder chooses to restrict his budget in every
equilibrium of their game. Zheng [2001] describes a model where bidders are able
to supplement an existing cash position by borrowing at some fixed interest rate
(common to all bidders) prior to the auction to finance their bids in a first-price
auction. In addition, the bidders may choose after the auction to default on their
bids. These two features are shown to have strong impacts on bidding behavior,
such as low-budget bidders bidding more than high-budget bidders for some values
of the interest rate.
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan [2005] consider a model similar to the one of
Zheng [2001] where bidders supplement a cash position by going to a competitive
financing market before and/or after a first-price auction takes place.6 They con-
sider a variety of financing schemes and ask the question of which schemes lead to
efficient outcomes in the auction. In a similar vein Zheng [2010] considers a situation
where a social planner auctioning a good to cash constrained bidders has a choice of
financing schemes to offer bidders and would like to choose the one that maximizes
the efficiency of the outcome.
Another branch of literature considers the mechanism design problem, in the
spirit of Myerson [1981], of auctioning an item (or items) to bidders with exoge-
nous budget constraints. Various approaches to the difficult problems of a seller
maximizing revenue or efficiency have been taken, each imposing different restric-
6 Another variation of this idea is presented in Hyde and Vercammen [2002].
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tions [Laffont and Robert, 1996, Che and Gale, 1999, 2000, Maskin, 2000, Malakhov
and Vohra, 2008, Pai and Vohra, 2008].7 There is a similar line of work in the
computer science literature.8
Finally, this paper is similar to work in the industrial organization literature
that examines the incentives of owner-manager pairs in oligopoly models [Fershtman
and Judd, 1987].
2.3 Model
The model extends the Milgrom and Weber [1982] model of auctions with
affiliated values to allow for a budgeting stage prior to a sealed-bid auction for a
single good. To each of N bidders I add a principal responsible for setting their
bidder’s budget constraint prior to the auction (there are a total of 2N players
in the game). Each bidder plays the role of the manager in the firm and each
principal plays the role of the board of directors. Given their expected valuations of
the asset, both are interested in maximizing the expected profit of the firm at the
auction (expected valuation minus expected payment). This could be modeled by
making both equity holders in the firm, so that they each receive a constant fraction
of the firm’s profits. The agency problem is the result of a systematic difference in
how principals and bidders value the asset.
Temporarily ignoring the principals and the budget constraints, the relation
7 For example, Laffont and Robert [1996] restrict all bidders to have the same budget constraint,
while Maskin [2000] assumes that the budget constraint is common knowledge.
8 See Kotowski [2010] for a list of papers in this area.
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between the bidders from opposing firms is as it is in the Milgrom and Weber [1982]
model. So I am assuming that the bidders are symmetric and have valuations for
the good which may incorporate both private and common value components. In
the notation of Milgrom and Weber [1982], bidder i values the object according to
uBi (Ti, {Tj}j 6=i), where uB is symmetric in its last N − 1 arguments,9 increasing in
Ti, nondecreasing in Tj (j 6= i), nonnegative and continuous.10 I use Ti to represent
the signal of bidder i. Capital letters will be used for random variables, while
bold typeface indicates a vector. Note that I am implicitly assuming here that the
bidders’ valuations only depend on bidder-specific information.
The bidders’ signals are assumed to be affiliated and symmetrically distributed
on [t, t]N according to some bounded, atomless density f(t) with respect to the
Lebesgue measure. Affiliation is equivalent to the density being log-supermodular
almost everywhere.11 The signals are symmetrically distributed if for any permuta-
tion π(t) of t, f(t) = f(π(t)).
The bidders (or agents) have no capital with which to make their bids, so they
must rely entirely on the funding decision of their principal. In the first stage of
the game, each of the principals privately observes some signal about the value of
9 In other words, if π(T−i) is any permutation of the vector of opposing signals then I am
assuming that uBi (Ti,T−i) = u
B
i (Ti, π(T−i)).
10 Milgrom and Weber [1982] also allow for the utility function to depend on a vector of signals
(labeled S1, S2, . . . in the paper) that are not specific to any bidder. I do not make use of these
signals here, so they are omitted.
11 Milgrom and Weber [1982] discuss the affiliation property in detail. The affiliation property is
also known outside economics as multivariate total positivity of order 2 [Karlin and Rinott, 1980].
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the asset to the company, and based on that signal sets a budget constraint for the
bidder at auction. I first consider the case where the principal may only select a
hard budget constraint (i.e., the principal allocates a fixed amount of funds which
the bidder must not exceed). I briefly consider the case of a soft budget constraint
at the end of the paper (Section 2.6).
Both the bidder and the principal are assumed to receive a zero payoff from
losing or not participating in the auction. The principal may set a budget constraint
that is low enough to prevent the bidder from winning.
Two conditions on the relationship between each principal and bidder motivate
the principal’s use of a budget constraint in the model. The first condition is that
given the same information the bidder would be willing to bid more for the asset than
the principal would. As mentioned in the introduction this could be the result of
the bidder’s empire-building motives or gaining some private payoff from controlling
more assets irrespective of the payoff to the firm.
The second is that the bidder is better informed about the value of the asset
to the firm than the principal. This could be the result of the bidder’s specialized
knowledge about the market that the firm operates in. The assumption motivates
the principal to employ the bidder to decide on a bid rather than submitting a bid
directly herself.
These conditions are formalized in the model by specifying that the relation-
ship between the principal i’s valuation, uPi (Ti, {Tj}j 6=i), and bidder i’s valuation is
such that for all realizations t the principal’s valuation is smaller. To simplify the
solution to the model, I use a linear relationship between the two given by
14
uBi (t) = ui(t) > δui(t) = u
P
i (t) (2.1)
with 0 < δ < 1 representing how the principal discounts the bidder’s assessment
of the value of the good to the firm. Equivalently one could call 1/δ the amount
by which the bidder overstates the value of the asset due to his interest in empire-
building.12
The principal and bidder are assumed to receive a constant fraction of the
payoff to the firm, and thereby are interested in maximizing the firm’s payoff directly.
Specifically, let σP and σB be the principal’s and bidder’s shares of firm stock and
suppose that firm i wins the item for a payment of p. Then bidder i receives
σB(ui(t)−p) = σB(1−δ)ui(t)+σB(δui(t)−p) and principal i receives σP (δui(t)−p),
where I let δui(t) be the value to the firm. Note that the term σB(1 − δ)ui(t) is
the bidder’s private gain from empire-building. Because the shares, σB and σP ,
are assumed to be constant and non-zero they cannot affect the decisions of the
principals and bidders, so they are omitted from the rest of the paper.
Principal i receives a signal, Si, in the first stage which is informative because
it is affiliated with the bidder i’s signal. Affiliation between Si and Ti and the
previous assumptions made on the distribution of T imply that all of the signals in
12 All of the results in the paper go through if one assumes that uBi (t) > u
P
i (t) for all t and that
the principal’s valuation can be written as uPi (t) = d(u
B
i (t)) where d(x) < x for all x and d(x)
is increasing and convex. These conditions preserve the assumptions made in Theorem 1. The
results on soft budget constraints (Section 2.6) can also be extended to allow for such a relationship
between the bidder’s and principal’s valuations.
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the model are affiliated; however, allowing for arbitrary dependencies between the
principals’ signals turns out to be problematic for the specification of the equilibrium
described here. So I make the further assumption that conditional on Ti = ti, Si
is independent of the other signals. In other words, principal i’s signal provides
no additional information about other signals in the model once bidder i’s signal is
known. I believe this assumption complements the assumption that the bidders are
better informed about the valuation of the good. The bidders in the model generally
have better information about the environment than the principals, and this seems
natural if bidder is a specialist. Formally, one may write the joint distribution of
(s, t) as f(s, t) = fT(t)
∏N
i=1 fSi |Ti(si | ti).
Figure 2.1 illustrates the information structure of the model with N = 4.
The nodes in the graph represent the signals of all of players. Bidders’ signals are
labeled Bi, and principals’ signals are labeled Pi. The edges represent the statistical
dependence between the signals.
Finally, I assume that information is private to each of the principal-agent
pairs throughout the first and the second stages. In other words, nothing is learned
by firm i about the signal or budget of firm j after the conclusion of the first stage.
2.4 Equilibrium
I describe symmetric equilibrium strategies in this model for the first- and
second-price auctions. As in Milgrom and Weber [1982] I consider the second-price


















Fig. 2.1: Information Structure (N = 4)
budgets, w(s), called the budget function, and a bid function for the bidders, B(s, t),
that depends on signals received by the bidder and the principal. I distinguish
between the “constrained” bid function B(s, t) that incorporates the budget into
the bid and the “unconstrained” bid function b(t) representing the bid that each
bidder would make in the absence of a budget constraint.13 In considering the
problem facing the principal and bidder of a particular firm it is helpful to recognize
that I can treat the strategies (bids and budgets) of the opposing firms as fixed
throughout the first and the second stage. This is a consequence of the assumption
that firms do not observe the actions of the other firms until the auction is finished.
13 The unconstrained bid function is not a function of the principal’s signal, because the princi-
pal’s signal does not enter into the value of the asset. Also due to the conditional independence of
the principal’s signal, the bidder safely disregards this information.
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Taking the perspective of bidder i, the basic idea behind the equilibria of
the first- and second-price auction is to recognize that if the opposing principals use
symmetric, increasing strategies and the opposing bids take a form that is increasing
in both signals, the bids that bidder i faces are affiliated (see footnote 14). If one
then appropriately modifies the definitions of the key objects in the Milgrom and
Weber [1982] paper, the unconstrained choice of bidder i takes the same form as
the equilibrium strategy in Milgrom and Weber [1982], and quasi-concavity of the
objective implies that B(s, t) takes the form B(s, t) = min{b(t), w(s)}. Using this
conclusion, I can then provide a result for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
for the principals.
2.4.1 Second-Price Auction
Consider the decision of bidder i given some arbitrary budget constraint. Sup-
pose the equilibrium b(t) is increasing and continuous. Then the selection of a
budget constraint in bid space is equivalent to the selection of a “cutoff” type in
type space. Define the function t̂(s) as w(s) = b(t̂(s)), so that a selection t̂(s) is
equivalent to the selection w(s).
The description of equilibrium strategies is simplified if I define the random
variable T̃ = min{T, t̂(S)}. In equilibrium T̃ will represent the information that
is revealed by an opposing bidder’s bid. To describe the equilibrium I start by
assuming that the opposing principals all use the increasing strategy t̂(s) and that
the opposing bidders’ strategies take the form
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B(s, t) = min{b(t), b(t̂(s))} = b(min{t, t̂(s)}) = b(t̃) (2.2)
where b(t) is some increasing function. The second equality follows because b(t)
is increasing and min is nondecreasing. If the opposing bids take this form then
the highest opposing bid is submitted by the opposing bidder with the highest
realization of T̃ . In this sense, one can think of T̃ as representing the type of an
opposing bidder.
The distribution of T̃ is a function of the signals of the principal and the
bidder, along with the strategy used by the principals. Each T̃ is a composition
of nondecreasing functions of affiliated random variables. A straightforward appli-
cation of Theorem 23 in Milgrom and Weber [1982] shows that T1, T̃2, . . . , T̃N are
affiliated.14 Also, affiliation between Ti and Si and a similar argument implies that
Si, Ti, T̃−i are affiliated. It follows that the first order statistic of T̃−i (denoted T̃(1))
and Ti are affiliated [Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Theorem 2].
Now define the function v(x, y) = E[u(T) |Ti = x, T̃(1) = y].15 Given the
assumptions on u and affiliation, v(x, y) is increasing in x and nondecreasing in y.
14 By Theorem 23, Z = (S, T ) being affiliated is equivalent to the following inequality holding
for any nondecreasing g, increasing set A, and sublattice S,
E[g(Z) |AS] ≥ E[g(Z) |S] ≥ E[g(Z) | ÂS]
Let Z̃1 = T1 and Z̃i = T̃i for i 6= 1. For some nondecreasing function h, h(Z̃) is the composition
of two nondecreasing functions of Z and hence h(Z̃) = g(Z) for some g. Therefore, the above
inequality holds for any h and Z̃ is affiliated.
15 This function will play a role analogous to the v(x, y) defined in Milgrom and Weber [1982].
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If the opposing bidders adopt the strategy b(t̃), and bidder i makes a bid according
to b(t′), then bidder i wins in the event that t′ > T̃(1). Assuming that the opposing
bids take the form b(t̃) = v(t̃, t̃), bidder i’s payoff from bidding according to b(t′)
when his true signal is t is
∫ t′
t
(v(t, x)− v(x, x))g(x | t) dx (2.3)
where g(x | t) is used for the density of T̃(1) conditional on t.16 By direct analogy
with Milgrom and Weber [1982], this function is maximized by choosing t′ = t. For
t′ < t, it is increasing. Therefore, a choice of t̃ = min{t, t̂} satisfies the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum.
Lemma 1. Assume the N − 1 other bidders use the strategy b−i(x) = v(x, x) and
that the other principals use the same increasing budget function given by t̂−i(s),
then the unconstrained best response of bidder i is b(t) = v(t, t). Given a budget
t̂(s), the constrained best response is to bid min{b(t), b(t̂(s))} = b(t̃).
The unconstrained best response defined above is the bidder’s expected payoff
conditional on his own information and the information contained in the event that
his bid is just equal to the second highest bid. In that sense, this equilibrium is
analogous to the one prescribed by Milgrom and Weber [1982].
The budget constraint manifests itself in the above strategies by forcing to the
bidder to bid as if his signal were lower than it is. That is, there is a sense in which
16 Due to the principals’ signals being independent condition on the realizations of the bidders’
signals g(x | t, s) = g(x | t).
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the bidder is not conditioning on the “correct” information when he makes his bid.
However, this is a natural consequence of treating the budget constraints for the
principal as a choice in type-space rather than bid-space.
Given the description of second stage play, the principal’s problem is to select
a budget constraint that has the effect of lowering the bid of her bidder on average.
Left unconstrained the bidders will always select bids that are higher than the
principals would like him to.17
Letting f(t | s) be the density of the bidder’s signal conditional on the princi-
pal’s signal, the payoff to a principal receiving a signal of s and choosing a budget











(δv(t, x)− v(x, x))g(x | t)f(t | s) dx dt
The first and second terms correspond to the payoff to the principal when the
bidder is unconstrained and constrained. After canceling terms and rewriting, the
first order condition for this problem can be written as follows
17 Consider, for example, the case where the principals observe their bidders’ signals directly
and decide on bids directly. In this case, the symmetric equilibrium is for the principals to bid





(δv(t, t̂)− v(t̂, t̂))g(t̂ | t)f(t | s) dt
= E[δu(Ti,T−i)− u(t̂,T−i) |Ti ≥ t̂, T̃(1) = t̂, s]
× P (Ti ≥ t̂ | T̃(1) = t̂, s) (2.4)
where the second line replaces the function v with the utility function u. The equa-
tion is satisfied by setting t̂ so that the expected payoff to the principal conditional
on the principal’s information, the budget constraint binding, and the highest op-
posing bidder having an effective type of t̂ is zero. For some values of s, there may
be no t̂ in the support of Ti for which the right hand side of (2.4) is positive, in which
case the principal optimally sets t̂ = t and prevents the bidder from participating.
To prove that an equilibrium exists I take advantage of work on the existence
of monotone pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information [Athey,
2001, Reny, 2011]. Using results from these papers I am able to show that existence
follows from a single crossing condition being satisfied. A sufficient condition for
a single crossing condition to hold in this model is that the right-hand side of
equation (2.4) be increasing in s. A sufficient condition for this to be true is that
δu(ti, t−i) − u(ti, t−i) is nondecreasing in (ti, t−i), since affiliation between Si and
(Ti,T−i) then implies that the expectation is increasing in s [Milgrom and Weber,
1982, Theorem 5]. The second term, P (Ti ≥ t̂ | T̃(i) = t̂, s), is the expected value of
a nondecreasing function of Ti, so it also must be nondecreasing in s.
Theorem 1. If the right-hand side of equation (2.4) is increasing in s, a symmetric
equilibrium in the second-price auction described above is given by b(t) = v(t, t) and
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w(s) = b(t̂(s)), where t̂(s) solves (2.4) when t̂(s) > t.
Proof. Given Lemma 1, the principals may be thought of as competing against each
other in an odd sort of auction, where each is asked to name a value for t̂ and their
bid is calculated according to min{v(t, t), v(t̂, t̂)} so that there bid is random from
their perspective. Note that conditional on t the bid is not increasing in t̂ for all t̂,
but the expected bid is increasing for all t̂ ∈ (t, t). I show that this game satisfies
the conditions in Athey [2001] including her single crossing condition, and hence
possesses an equilibrium in increasing strategies.
The right-hand side of equation (2.4) being an increasing function of s implies
that if π is the principal’s objective we have πt̂s > 0. This in turn implies the single
crossing condition.
I need to verify assumptions A1-A3 in Athey [2001] to apply Theorem 6 in that
paper. A1 and A2 follow by assumptions made on the joint density and the utility
function. A3 in this case requires that E[δui(T) | si,Wi(t̂′i, t̂−i)] be increasing in s and
nondecreasing in t̂′, where Wi(t̂
′
i, t̂−i) represents the event that the principal i wins
with t̂′i when the other principals set budget constraints according to t̂−i. Employing
Theorem 5 from Milgrom and Weber [1982] again, this expression is increasing in si
and nondecreasing in t̂′i.
Since the random variable T̃ is not a primitive of the model, I also need to
verify that in equilibrium its distribution satisfies the assumptions of the Athey
[2001] paper. In particular, it should not have any mass points except at the lower
bound of the support. But as long as t̂(s) is increasing this is true.
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Therefore, Theorem 6 applies and an equilibrium in increasing strategies ex-
ists. Furthermore, a symmetric equilibrium, which is required for the arguments
made above, also exists. This model satisfies the requirements of Theorem 4.5 in
Reny [2011], which guarantees the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in increas-
ing strategies when the bids are restricted to a finite action space. Following the
arguments in Athey [2001] but considering only sequences of symmetric equilibria
as the bid space becomes finer, it follows that a symmetric equilibrium exists when
the bid space is a continuum.
2.4.2 First-Price Auction
The analysis of the first-price auction proceeds in the same way, beginning
with the problem faced by the bidder. As in the second-price auction, I am able
to make use of the equilibrium identified in the Milgrom and Weber [1982] paper
for the first-price auction. With v(x, y) and g(x | t) defined as above, define the




v(y, y) dL(y | t)
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Now suppose that the opposing bidders bid according to b(t) when they are
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unconstrained. Again, since b(t) is an increasing, continuous function, the principal’s
choice of a budget constraint in bid space is equivalent to the choice of a cutoff type
in type space. So if the opposing principals adopt the increasing strategy t̂(s), the
opposing bids take the form
B(s, t) = min{b(t), b(t̂(s))} = b(min{t, t̂(s)}) = b(t̃)
Again, define the random variable T̃ = min{T, t̂(S)} with conditional density
g(x | t). I can now represent the payoff to bidder i of bidding b(t′) as
∫ t′
t
(v(t, x)− b(x))g(x | t) dx (2.5)
where I am again using the fact that a bid of b(t′) against opposing bids of b(t̃)
wins in the event that t′ > T̃(1). The idea behind the following lemma is exactly the
same as in the second-price auction. The new objects v(x, y) and g(x | t) have the
same properties as their analogues in Milgrom and Weber [1982], so the proof that
it is optimal for the unconstrained bidder to select t′ = t proceeds in the same way.
The constrained bidder cannot select t, but as Milgrom and Weber [1982] show the
objective is increasing for t′ < t, so it must be optimal to select t′ = t̂. Finally, the
argument for why the bid function must be continuous goes through in the same
way.18
18 The continuity argument in Milgrom and Weber [1982] depends on the symmetry of the signals.
For differentiability, one may either rescale the signals to make the bid function differentiable
[Milgrom and Weber, 1982] or notice that if the bid function is monotonic it must be differentiable
almost everywhere. Combined with continuity these two properties imply that the differential
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Lemma 2. Let b(t) =
∫ t
t






G(z | z) dz
}
. If
the opposing bidders bid according to b−i(t̃) with t̂−i(s) increasing, then the uncon-
strained best response of bidder i is b(t). Due to the quasi-concavity of bidder i’s
objective, the choice min{b(t), b(t̂(s))} = b(t̃) is a constrained best response.
The principal’s payoff in the first-price auction can be written as the payoff in











(δv(t, x)− b(t̂))g(x | t)f(t | s) dx dt








g(t̂ | t)− b′(t̂)G(t̂ | t)
}





δv(t, t̂)− b(t̂)− b′(t̂)G(t̂ | t)
g(t̂ | t)
}






∣∣∣ Ti ≥ t̂, T̃(1) = t̂, s]
× P (Ti ≥ t̂ | T̃(1) = t̂, s) (2.6)
An equilibrium in monotone pure strategies exists here as long as I can show
that the same single crossing condition is satisfied. For the first-price auction the
single crossing condition is satisfied immediately without the additional assumptions
equation defines the behavior of the bidder almost everywhere which is all that is required for a
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
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made in the second-price auction case. The integrand in the expectation in equa-
tion 2.6 is increasing in T because the utility function is increasing by assumption
and the term G(t̂ | t)/g(t̂ | t) is decreasing in t by affiliation.
Theorem 2. A symmetric equilibrium in the first-price auction described above is
given by b(t) and w(s) = b(t̂(s)), where b(t) is defined in Lemma 2 and t̂(s) solves
(2.6) when t̂(s) > t.
Proof. The discussion preceding the proof shows that the Athey [2001] single cross-
ing condition is satisfied here. The remainder of the proof proceeds exactly as in
Theorem 1.
2.5 Revenue and Efficiency
The primary focus of the existing literature on budget constraints in auctions
has been on their effect on expected revenue and to a lesser extent on expected
efficiency (or social surplus). For the first and second-price auctions, Che and Gale
[1998] find that the first-price auction dominates the second-price auction both in
terms of expected revenue and expected efficiency.
The strongest results comparing the revenue and efficiency in this model come
from considering a special case of the model where an independence condition is
satisfied between bidders. In this case we are able to show that the first- and
second-price auctions perform equivalently in terms of both efficiency and revenue.
Later in the section I return to the question of the relative performance of the first-
and second-price auctions with affiliated values. In that case I am able to rank
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the auctions on efficiency and provide a partial result for revenue. There are two
counteracting effects on revenue so it is difficult to determine the relative ranking
in general. However, I am able to give an example where the second-price auction
raises more revenue than the first-price auction.
2.5.1 Independent Signals
I make use of the affiliation property twice in the model described above. The
first use of affiliation relates the signals of the bidders, while the second use of
affiliation relates the signals of a particular principal to her corresponding bidder.
In the independence case I make the stronger assumption that the bidders’ signals
are statistically independent. In other words I may write the joint distribution
of random variables in the model as f(s, t) =
∏N
i=1 fSi,Ti(s, t), where fSi,Ti(s, t) is
affiliated.
Since independent signals are trivially affiliated, the strategies described in
Theorems 1 and 2 are also equilibria with independent signals. The important effect
of independence is to simplify the principal’s decision. The key step is to recognize
that the distribution of the effective types of the opposing bidders, represented by
g(x | t) in the previous expressions, no longer depends on t when the independence

























(δv(t, x)− v(x, x))g(x)f(t | s) dx dt





By inspection, the principal’s payoff function is the same under both auctions when
the independence condition holds implying that the principal must make the same
choice for t̂ in both auctions.
To complete the equivalence argument, observe that due to the way the equilib-
rium strategies are defined the resulting bids are equivalent to the bids that would
be observed in an independent private values auction without budget constraints
with signals distributed according to T̃ = min{T, t̂(S)}. Therefore, the revenue
equivalence theorem applies.
Since the principals and the bidders disagree about the value of the asset to
the firm, the efficiency of the auction is potentially ambiguous. The auction may
be called efficient if it always allocates to the bidder with the highest valuation, but
one may also define efficiency in terms of the valuation of the principals. In this
model, however, there is no ambiguity because the bidder with the highest valuation
is always paired with the principal with the highest valuation.
With independence between bidders, the two auctions perform the same in
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terms of efficiency. With the same budget constraint function in both auctions, the
same realization of signals must yield the same winner, and the two auctions cannot
differ in their allocations.
Theorem 3. When signals are independent across bidders, the first- and second-
price auctions with budget constraints are equivalent, both in terms of expected rev-
enue and expected efficiency.
The equivalence in terms of efficiency and revenue also implies that the two
auctions are payoff equivalent for both the principal and the bidder. In fact, the
bidder’s bidding behavior makes the type of auction (first- or second-price) and
the distribution of the opposing bidder’s signals irrelevant to the principal. The
principal’s decision is completely determined by the valuation function and the joint
distribution of her signal and the bidder’s, f(t | s). This is a direct consequence of
treating the principal’s decision in type-space though. The actual budget constraints
(i.e., b(t̂)) do vary between the auction formats because the bid functions differ.
Note that we will not have full efficiency here because the budget constraint
will occasionally bind, so it is possible that the bidder with the highest realization
of T loses to another bidder because he is budget constrained.
To illustrate these results it is helpful to consider a linear example.
There are 2 firms. Each principal receives a signal, S, distributed uniformly on
[0, 1]. Conditional on the principal’s signal, s, the bidder’s signal is uniformly
distributed on [s, s + 1], so the relation between the two signals is T = S + ε
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where ε ∼ U [0, 1].19 The bidder has a private value for the item given by his
signal, t, and the principal values the item at δt.
For either auction, principal i chooses t̂ to solve
E[δTi − t̂ |Ti ≥ t̂, s] = 0
which has the solution t̂(s) = δ
2−δ (s + 1). So the bidder is budget constrained
when ε > δ
2−δ −
2−2δ
2−δ s. Note that as δ approaches 1 the principal relaxes the
budget constraint eventually leaving the bidder unconstrained. When δ = 1 the
principal can trust the bidder to bid exactly as she would if she were to observe
T .
In the second-price auction, a unconstrained bidder with signal t has a dominant
strategy to bid his value, t. From the seller’s perspective (or the perspective of
an opponent) individual bids are therefore distributed according to the random
variable W where W = min{S + ε, δ
2−δ (S + 1)}.
In the first-price auction, the unconstrained best response of a bidder with signal
t is
b(t) = E[W |W ≤ t]
and to the seller bids are distributed according to b(W ).
19 The joint density of T and S can be written as f(t, s) = 1{s ≤ t ≤ s+ 1}1{0 ≤ s ≤ 1} which
is affiliated. The bidder’s signals are clearly independent of one another.
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In both auctions, the seller’s expected revenue is the expected value of W(2)
where W(2) is the second order statistic of W . Note that the auction from the
seller’s perspective is equivalent to a independent, private values auction where
values are drawn according to the distribution of W .
Finally, either auction allocates the good inefficiently if, for example, t1 < t2 but
W1 > W2 which occurs with positive probability.
2.5.2 Affiliated Signals
When signals between bidders are affiliated, the first- and second-price auction
are no longer equivalent from the perspective of the principal. In fact, given a signal
s if the principal were to choose the same budget constraint in both auctions, she
would earn a higher payoff from the first-price auction when bidder’s signals are
affiliated. The reason for this is that the principal expects to pay less in the first-
price auction when she sets the same budget constraint because affiliation between
the bidders causes the average bid in the second-price auction to be higher [Milgrom
and Weber, 1982].
The principal’s preference for the first-price auction leads the principal to relax
the budget constraint in the first-price auction relative to the second-price auction.
Specifically, I show below that for a given s, the principal chooses a greater t̂ in the
first-price auction.
Theorem 4. In first- and second-price auctions with the same distribution of sig-
nals, let t̂F (s) and t̂S(s) be equilibrium strategies of the principals in the first- and
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second-price auctions. It must be that t̂F (s) ≥ t̂S(s) for all s.
Proof. Let γ(x | y) = g(x | y)
G(x | y) and note that affiliation implies that γ(x | y) is increasing
in y [Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Lemma 1]. Using this and replacing b′(t̂) the right




δv(t, t̂)− v(t̂, t̂)
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G(t̂ | t)f(t | s) dt (2.7)
The first term corresponds to the first order condition for the second-price
auction, (2.4). The second term must be positive for t > t̂ because γ is increasing
in its second argument and v(t̂, t̂) > b(t̂). This is true for any symmetric, increasing
strategy used by the opposing principals.
Next, suppose that there exists equilibria such that t̂F (s) < t̂S(s) for some s
where the inequality holds on a set of nonzero measure. I show that the first order
condition in the first-price auction at such a t̂F cannot hold. Let φ(t̂(s), s, t̂′) be the
first order condition for the principal in the second-price auction when she receives
signal s, sets budget t̂ and the opposing principals set budgets according to t̂′. So we
have φ(t̂S(s), s, t̂S) = 0. For some s′ < s, φ(t̂F (s), s′, t̂F ) = 0 where t̂F (s) = t̂S(s′).
Since the single crossing condition holds strictly, φ(t̂F (s), s, t̂F ) > 0. This and the
argument in the previous paragraph imply that (2.7) must be positive for such an
t̂F .
Relaxing the budget constraint must improve the efficiency of the auction
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because the allocation is more likely to depend on the bidders’ signals and not the
principals’. Since it is the bidders’ signals that determine the value of the asset in
the model, this must improve efficiency.
Corollary 1. The first-price auction with budget constraints is more efficient than
the second-price auction with budget constraints.
Proof. I show that Theorem 4 implies for a given realization of signals if the first-
price auction allocates inefficiently the second-price auction must too. The idea
is similar to the one used in Theorem 1 of Che and Gale [1998]. Suppose that
bidder 1 has the highest signal, t1, but bidder 2 wins in the first-price auction so
min{t1, t̂F (s1)} < min{t2, t̂F (s2)}. First, bidder 1’s budget constraint must bind
(otherwise bidder 1 would win). There are two cases, (i) t̂F (s1) < t2 < t̂
F (s2) and
(ii) t̂F (s1) < t̂
F (s2) < t2. In the second-price auction, each of the principals chooses
a lower t̂ (Theorem 4), so bidder 1’s budget binds and by examining (i) and (ii) it
is clear that bidder 2 must be the winner.
The first-price auction, however, might allocate efficiently when the second-
price auction does not. This occurs if, for example, t2 < t1 < t̂
F (s1) < t̂
F (s2) (so
bidder 1 wins in the first-price auction) but t̂S(s1) < t2 < t1 < t̂
S(s2) (so bidder 2
wins in the second-price auction).
Interestingly, Che and Gale [1998] also find that the first-price auction is more
efficient in their model. Recall that in their model the budget constraint is treated
as an exogenous random variable for each bidder which does not depend on the type
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of auction. The result of this is that the incentive for bidders to shade their bids in
the first-price auction also causes the budget constraints to bind less often relative
to the second-price auction. In contrast, here the budget constraints are binding less
often because the principals are choosing to relax the budget constraint in response
to the first-price auction offering a higher payoff with affiliated signals. Also note
that when bidders receive independent signals there is no efficiency advantage to
the first-price auction in this model, and the Che and Gale [1998] model makes an
analogous assumption about independence of bidders’ signals.
The efficiency result is likely restricted to the symmetric environment I con-
sider here, as the second-price auction tends to outperform the first-price auction on
efficiency in standard models when the environment is asymmetric (see for example
Proposition 2 in Maskin [1996]).
When considering expected revenue, there are two counteracting effects here
and without an explicit solution for the equilibria it is difficult to determine which
one dominates. The first effect identified by Milgrom and Weber [1982] is also known
as the linkage principal and has been shown to lead the second-price auction to raise
more revenue. This effect is certainly present in the model, but so is the effect of
the principal relaxing the budget constraint in the first-price auction which favors
the first-price auction in terms of revenue.
Example 2.5.2 shows that for at least some distributions the Milgrom and
Weber [1982] ranking holds. Note that this is the opposite ranking of the one found
in Che and Gale [1998]. I leave the question of whether or not this ranking always
holds in the model for future research.
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Let N = 2 and suppose that the joint distribution of (t1, t2) ∈ [0, 1]2 is given by
f(t1, t2) = 3 min{t1, t2}.20 Assume that Si and Ti are perfectly correlated, and
the bidders have private values with u(t) = ti for bidder i.
In the second-price auction, the solution to the principal’s problem is to set
t̂(s) = δs. The result is that the bidder is always budget constrained, bidding
according to δs. Since the budget constraints always bind in this case, bidder 1
and principal 1 win when s1 > s2 or t1 > t2. The principal’s expected payment
is then δE[S2 |S2 < s1] = 23δs1.
The solution to the first-price auction is more involved. I start by assuming that
the strategy of the opposing principal is linear (i.e., t̂(s) = s/α). From this I
calculate the following
g(t̂ | t) = 2α
2− t


















which has the solution α = 3+δ
4δ
. Again, the budget constraint always binds so
principal 1 wins when s1 > s2. principal 1’s expected payment can be written as
20 This is the distribution from Example 6.2 in Krishna [2002] truncated to [0, 1]2.
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b(t̂(s1))P (S2 < s1 | s1) =
2
3







2−s1 < 1 for s1 ∈ (0, 1), the principal’s expected payment is lower in the
first-price auction.
2.6 Soft Budget Constraints
Up to this point, the principal has been constrained to hard budget constraints.
An alternative would be to allow the principal to setup a cost schedule for the bidder
that assigns a charge to the bidder for each bid he might select in the auction, so
that a bid of b might cost the bidder c(b) to place. One way for the principal to
implement this might be to allow the bidder to borrow any amount from her but to
apply a financing charge to each bid, c(b)− b.
There turns out to be an natural choice for this cost schedule (in the first-
and second-price auctions at least) that induces the bidder to bid exactly as the
principal would were she to have the same information as the bidder. This implies
that the game is equivalent to a one stage game where the principals observe both
S and T (although having observed T the information contained in S is irrelevant)
and decide on bids directly.
Consider the second-price auction, and suppose that the principals observe
T and may decide on a bid directly. Define w(x, y) = E[u(T) |Ti = x, T(1) =
y].21 Then in the symmetric equilibrium each principal bids according to b(t) =
21 T(1) is the first order statistic of the other bidders’ signals.
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δw(t, t) [Milgrom and Weber, 1982]. Now consider the cost schedule given by c(b) =
b/δ, so that if the bidder wins the item his payoff is u(t)−b/δ where b is the payment
made. In this case the bidder’s equilibrium strategy is to set b/δ = w(t, t), which is
exactly the bid that principal would make given the same information as the bidder.
The cost schedule c(b) = b/δ has the same effect on the first price auction.










(δv(t, x)− b(x))h(x | t) dx
where to avoid confusion I use h(x | t) to represent the density of T(1) given t. So the
bidder’s objective is a monotonic transformation of what the principal’s objective
would be if the principal observed t and submitted a bid in the auction directly. If
every principal imposes the same cost schedule, then the game is equivalent to the
one where the principals all observe their bidders’ signals and participate directly
in the auction, because the objective functions coincide.
Theorem 5. When the principal’s are allowed to use arbitrary cost schedules to
finance bids in the first- and second-price auctions, it is an equilibrium for the prin-
cipals to choose the cost schedule c(b) = b/δ. The result is that the bids submitted
coincide with hypothetical bids submitted by principals participating in an auction
with all of the information available to them.
Because the bids submitted coincide with the hypothetical game involving only
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principals, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 2. In the game with soft budget constraints, the revenue and efficiency
of the first- and second-price auctions are identical to that of the hypothetical games
where the principals observe T and submit bids directly.
In other words, in this model introducing soft budget constraints does not
change the revenue rankings of Milgrom and Weber [1982]. Also note that the
auction is fully efficient when the budget constraints are soft, because the firm with
the highest value of T must win the auction in the symmetric equilibrium.
2.7 Conclusion
Given the classic symmetric auction models (the standard independent private
values model and the Milgrom and Weber [1982] model) an important question for
auction theory has been how robust are these results to changes in the environment.
Budget constraints are cited as an example of a feature of real-world auctions that
would lead to failure of the revenue equivalence theorem [Krishna, 2002]. However,
results from models that incorporate budget constraints largely treat them as ex-
ogenous. In the model presented here I show that incorporating budget constraints
endogenously can reverse this conclusion and restore revenue equivalence between
the first- and second-price auction.
Taken together, the results from the hard and soft budget constraint versions
of the model suggest that incorporating endogenous budget constraints into auction
models may not significantly change the qualitative results on revenue and efficiency
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from the classic (symmetric) auction models.
In the hard budget constraint case I find the following. When signals are in-
dependent between bidders, revenue and efficiency equivalence holds between the
first- and second-price auctions. When signals are allowed to be affiliated as in Mil-
grom and Weber [1982], the auctions are no longer equivalent in terms of efficiency
but the revenue ranking of Milgrom and Weber [1982] holds in at least some cases.
Whether this ranking always holds or not is a question left for future research.
In the soft budget constraint case, there is no difference between the auctions
with budget constraints and auctions without budget constraints where the principal
bids directly. That is, the principal is able to perfectly control the behavior of the
bidder.
The previous literature on the effect of budget constraints on auctions suggests
that the first-price auction and even the all-pay auction should be preferred to
the second-price auction by a revenue or efficiency maximizing seller. However,
in auctions where budget constrained bidders are likely to exist (e.g., spectrum
auctions) the formats tend to resemble second-price auctions. For example, the
U.S. Federal Communications Commission uses a Simultaneous Multiple Round
Ascending auction. My results favor the second-price auction in many respects and
hence seem better aligned with observed practice.
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3. AN EXPERIMENT ON AUCTIONS WITH ENDOGENOUS
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
by Lawrence M. Ausubel, Justin E. Burkett, and Emel Filiz-Ozbay
3.1 Introduction
Beginning with important articles Che and Gale [1996, 1998], and active litera-
ture has explored the implications of budget constraints in auctions. This literature
models environments in which bidders have well-defined values for the items being
auctioned, but bidders may also be subject to binding budget constraints. For ex-
ample, a telecommunications entrant values a spectrum license at $800 million, but
may only have access to a budget of $500 million. The existing literature identifies
a number of interesting consequences. For example, a standard format such as the
second-price auction may not yield efficiency in the sense of allocating items to the
bidders who value them the most, as the highest-value bidder may have only the
second-highest budget. More surprisingly, budget constraints may cause first-price
auctions to outperform second-price auctions; with the bid-shading of the first-price
auction, bidders are less likely to find their bids constrained by their budgets than
in the second-price auction. This upsets revenue equivalence and results in the first-
price auction generating higher revenues. Moreover, since bids are relatively more
likely to reflect bidders’ values than their limited budgets, the first-price auction
may also yield greater efficiency than the second-price auction.
However, most of the conclusions of the existing literature are dependent on
the modeling assumption that budget constraints are exogenous. Recent work by
Burkett [2011] (see Chapter 2) demonstrates that the conclusions change qualita-
tively if budgets are allowed to be endogenous, determined as a solution to the
principal-agent problem that gives rise to the budget constraint. A principal seek-
ing to constrain the purchases of its agent ought to set a relatively more stringent
budget when the agent participates in a first-, as opposed to a second-price auction,
as identical budgets will leave the agent in the first-price auction unconstrained in
more states of the world. Comparing two auction formats, while assuming that the
principal sets the budget independently of the auction format, may make little more
sense than comparing two auction formats by assuming that bidders use the same
bid function in both auction format.
In this paper, we attempt to test the above reasoning experimentally. The
“bidder” (the agent) can be thought of as a manager at a firm that is bidding on an
asset. This manager has an empire-building motive for acquiring the asset, above
and beyond profit maximization for the firm. The “principal” (the human subject
of greatest interest) can be thought of as a senior executive or corporate board that
is responsible for allocating the firm’s investments and that seeks to constrain the
empire building. In laboratory experiments, we test whether the budget constraints
are exogenous with respect to the auction format – or whether the principal sets a
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lower budget for a first-price auction than for a second-price auction.
Our experimental results can be seen most easily in Figure 3.1, which displays
box plots of the selected budgets for each decile of signals from [0, 100] for both auc-
tion formats. The boxes indicate interquartile ranges range (IQR) and the whiskers
extend to the furthest data point within 1.5 ∗ IQR. The gray (left) boxes give the
budgets selected by the principal in first-price auctions and the black (right) boxes
give the budgets selected in second-price auctions. It is evident to the naked eye
that budgets are set significantly tighter in first-price than in second-price auctions
for all signal deciles except [0, 10]. Exogeneity of the budget choice is also rejected
by statistical tests.
Figure 3.1 displays clear results with a pair of human subjects in each exper-
iment – one taking the role of the principal and one taking the role of the bidder.
The results are even sharper when the human bidders are replaced by computerized
bidders, as displayed later in Figure 3.5. Since the computerized bidders consis-
tently follow predetermined rules, we are able to elicit more information about the
principals behavior in these sessions. Using this additional information, we show
that these data support the prediction that the principals constrain the same set of
bidder types across auction format, a key implication of the theoretical model.
Burkett (2011) demonstrated theoretically, in the model used here, that the
principal tightens the budget precisely so as to neutralize the change in auction
format from second- to first-price. Consequently, the second-price auction with
an endogenous budget constraint generates exactly the same theoretical expected
revenues as the first-price auction with an endogenous budget constraint – a res-
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Fig. 3.1: Budgets in First- and Second-Price Auctions with Human Bidders
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urrection of full revenue equivalence. While we test – and reject – this hypothesis
in the paper, this experimental finding is unsurprising in light of the traditional
experimental literature and is what we had expected to find. The experimental
auctions literature without budget constraints has consistently found that bidders
in the first-price auction bid higher than the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium, leading
to higher expected revenues in the first-price auction.1 Given this prior evidence,
it would have been surprising if adding a pre-auction budgeting decision by a prin-
cipal had eliminated the difference in expected revenues between the two auction
formats.2
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we specify
the theoretical model and explore its properties. In Section 3.3, we describe the
experimental design, and in Section 3.4, we give the experimental results. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Model
The models tested in the experiment are standard first- and second-price
sealed-bid, independent private values auction models with two bidders that have
1 See Cox et al. [1982]; Cox et al. [1988], as the seminal papers; and Kagel [1995] for a detailed
survey. Risk aversion [Cox et al., 1988], anticipation of regret [Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007], joy
of winning [see e.g. Goeree et al., 2002] , fear of loosing [Delgado et al., 2008], and level-k thinking
[Crawford and Iriberri, 2007] are offered as possible explanations of the overbidding phenomenon.
2 One interpretation of the results from Burkett [2011] is that the budgets in the model function
like bids that are not always “active.” If the subjects recognize this, one might expect similarities
between the budgeting decisions in this experiment and bidding decisions in the existing literature.
45
been extended to include a budgeting stage prior to the auction. In the budgeting
stage each bidder receives a budget from a principal. Both the principal and the
bidder receive a payoff in the event that the bidder wins the item at the auction;
however, the principal’s payoff is always lower than the bidder’s. This is due to an
additional private payoff that the bidder receives from the item that does not accrue
to the principal. It is this private payoff that motivates the principal to constrain
the bidder with a budget.
Formally, the game occurs in two stages. In the first stage, each principal
receives a signal about the value of the item and decides on a budget (bid cap)
for the bidder based on this information. Neither the principal’s signal nor the
budget choices are observed by any other principal-bidder pair. Having observed
their budgets, each bidder in the second stage observes their valuation for the good
and decides on a bid for the auction which may not exceed the bid cap set by the
principal. The winner of the auction is the principal and bidder team with the
highest bid. We consider first-price and second-price payment rules.
3.2.1 Payoffs
The payoffs to both parties are determined only by the information received
by the bidder. Specifically, we assume that if bidder i ∈ {1, 2} observes a valuation
of ti, principal i has a valuation for the item given by δti, where 0 < δ < 1. If
bidder i submits the winning bid in the auction and pays a price p, then bidder i
receives a payoff proportional to ti− p and principal i receives a payoff proportional
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to δti− p.3 That is, the bidder and the principal are both risk neutral and receive a
payoff that is determined by the difference between their respective valuations and
the price paid for the good.
3.2.2 Information
The signal received by principal i is denoted by si, assumed to be uniformly
distributed on [0, 100]. The signals of principals i and j are independent. The
principal does not observe her valuation for the good, but knows that her valuation
for the good, δti, is uniformly distributed on [0, si]. In other words, si determines the
upper limit of the principal’s valuation. Based on the realization of si, the principal
decides on a budget for the bidder, given by wi. Having observed her budget, wi,
bidder i observes her valuation for the object, ti, which given the assumption on the
principal’s valuation is uniformly distributed on [0, siδ]. The timing of the game is
depicted in Figure 3.2. The dashed edges indicate the dependence relations between
the signals, while the solid edges indicate the actions taken by the participants
(budgets were always referred to as caps in the experiment).
We chose these distributions for the experiment, because we wish to focus on
the budgeting decision and hence would like the game to be as simple as possible from
the principal’s perspective. Note that as δ decreases (increases) the upper limit on
3 The payoffs are proportional to those expressions to avoid double counting the total profits.
For example, the bidder and the principal might be equity holders in a firm with shares σb and σp,
respectively (where σb + σp ≤ 1). The bidder is assumed to receive σb (ti − p)) and the principal
to receive σp (δti − p)). This formulation identifies the term (1− δ)σbti (the difference between the













Fig. 3.2: Structure of the Game
the bidder’s valuation increases (decreases) and the agency problem becomes more
(less) severe.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
We consider a symmetric equilibrium of this model. The equilibrium will
consist of the bidder’s unconstrained choice of bid for a given valuation, b(t), and
the principal’s choice of budget for each possible signal, w(s). It can be shown that
given these two choices the bid submitted to the auction is min{b (t) , w (s)}.
Assuming that the bidders employ bidding strategies that are strictly increas-
ing and continuous functions of their valuations, each principal’s choice of budget
constraint is equivalent to choosing a cutoff type, t̂, above which the bidder is con-
strained. In other words for a choice of budget constraint, w(s), we can define a
cutoff type as the t that satisfies w (s) = b(t̂ (s)) where b(t) is the bidder’s uncon-
strained choice of bid corresponding to the value t.
The first consequence of this representation is that the bid submitted at the
auction is now b(min{t, t̂ (s)}), so that the winning bidder is the bidder with the
48
higher value of min{t, t̂ (s)}. We refer to this quantity as the bidder’s effective
type. The bids submitted at the auction are then equivalent to the bids submitted
in a standard independent private values auction where valuations are distributed
according to min{t, t̂ (s)}.
As is shown in [Burkett, 2011], the equilibrium choice of t̂ (s) is the same in
the first- and second-price auctions when bidders’ signals are independent and is the
solution to the following equation.
E[δt | t ≥ t̂(s), s] = t̂(s) (3.1)
A detailed derivation of the equilibrium is in Appendix A. In our setup, the
solution to Equation (3.1) is t̂ (s) = s
2−δ . This in turn implies that the distribution
of effective types is given by the following.


















In the second-price auction the bidder still has a weakly dominant strategy to
bid her own value. That is, in the second-price auction bSP (t) = t. In the first-price
auction, the equilibrium bid functions are determined according to the expected
value of the opponent’s effective type given a winning bid.
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Fig. 3.3: Unconstrained First-Price Bid Function (δ = 2/5)
Although this functional form is apparently complicated, Figure 3.3 shows
that it is approximately linear for δ = 2/5, the value used in the experiment. The
dashed line is the straight line connecting the end points of the bid function (the
slope is 7/16). In the figure the highest value of t shown is t = 125/2, which is the
highest possible value of t when δ = 2/5.
To summarize, in the second-price auction the equilibrium unconstrained bid






2−δ . In the first-price auction, the unconstrained bid function is











The notable results from this analysis are that the first- and the second-price
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auction raise the same expected revenue and have the same expected efficiency.4
This is a direct consequence of the bids being determined by the distribution of the
effective types, min{t, t̂(s)}, which as noted above is unchanged between the first-
and second-price auctions.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiments were run at the Experimental Economics Lab at the Uni-
versity of Maryland (EEL-UMD). All participants were undergraduate students at
the University of Maryland. The main experiment involved five sessions of second-
price sealed bid auctions (SP) and five sessions of first-price sealed bid auctions
(FP). In our control treatments we had five sessions of FP and five sessions of SP
where the bidders were computerized and principals were human subjects. In each
session there were 16 subjects. No subject participated in more than one session.
Therefore, we had 80 subjects per treatment with 320 subjects in total. The random
draws were balanced in the sense that we used the same sequence of random number
“seed” signals for each auction format, so the random value draws for SP matched
the random draws for FP.5 A new set of random draws was used for each session in
4 In fact, one can make the stronger assertion that the two auction formats agree in their
allocations for every possible realization of the signals. This is a consequence of the winner being
the one with the highest value of min {t, t̂(s)} in both cases.
5 The random draws were balanced within the main and control treatments not in between.
This is because in the main treatments, we had eight bidders and eight principals in a session and
in the control treatments we had sixteen principals in the lab where the bidders were computerized
players.
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each format, etc. Participants were seated in isolated booths. Each session lasted
less than two hours.6 Bidder instructions are in Appendix A. To test the subjects’
understanding of the instructions, they had to answer a sequence of multiple choice
questions. The auctions did not begin until each subject answered all of the multiple
choice questions correctly. The experiment is programmed in z-Tree [Fischbacher,
2007].
We start with explaining the design for the main treatments where both prin-
cipals and bidders were subjects. Later we will describe the control treatments with
computerized bidders.
In each session, each subject participated in 30 auctions. The first 5 auctions
were practice ones and they were only paid for the last 25 rounds. At the beginning
of a session, each subject was assigned a role randomly: principal or agent7. The
role of a subject was kept fixed throughout the session. There were eight principals
and eight bidders in the lab in each session. At each round a principal was randomly
matched with an agent and formed a team of two subjects. Then two teams were
randomly matched to participate in an auction. We made sure that not the same
group of people played against each other in two consecutive rounds.
In each auction, one fictitious item was sold to two randomly matched teams.
All decisions were anonymous. At the conclusion of each auction, the players learned
6 In a typical session, the instructions were described for 20-30 minutes while the actual play
lasted about an hour.
7 In the experiment, we call principals as Participant A, and agents as Participant B to avoid
any name driven bias.
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the outcome of the auction. In particular, each subject learned her actual value,
her and opponent team’s actual bids, whether her team had received the object,
the price paid by the winning team, and her own payoff8. The screen shots of the
experiment were in the instructions (see Appendix A)
In the beginning of an auction, each principal received a private signal from
the uniform distribution from [0,100], independently. They did not know their value
for the auctioned item at this time but they knew that the value was distributed
uniformly on [0,s] when the principal’s signal is s. Then the principal was asked to
submit a bid cap for her bidder.
After each principal submitted the cap, each bidder observed her value and
the cap set by the principal. The value of a bidder was 2.5 times more than the
value of the corresponding principal. Therefore, the value of a bidder was from the
uniform distribution on [0, 2.5s] when the corresponding principal’s signal is s. Then
the bidder is asked to enter her bid which was not allowed to exceed the cap.
After each bidder submitted a bid in behalf of her team, the team with the
highest bid won the auction and paid its bid (the opponent team’s bid) in the
first-price treatment (in the second-price treatment).
In the control treatments, where we aimed to better understand the principals’
8 They learned the opponent’s payoff when the opponent lost but we did not tell them the
opponent’s payoff when the opponent wins because in that case the subjects could determine the
actual value of the opponent and his bidding strategy to some extends. Since we used random
matching in each round to generate single shot games, we aimed to minimize the learning about
the strategy of the other subjects.
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behavior, the bidders were computerized. Again we tested first- and second-price
auctions. All the specifications such as the distribution of values and signals, number
of bidders in an auction, and the auction rules were the same as the main treat-
ments. In each session, there were 16 principals in the experimental laboratory. The
computerized bidders were programmed to play according to the equilibrium uncon-
strained bid functions as described in the theory section (Section 3.2). We provided
with three tools to the human principals in order to explain them the bidding strat-
egy of computerized bidders: 1) The graph of bidding function of the computerized
bidder; 2) A table summarizing the bids corresponding to some actual values; 3) An
interactive tool in the software. The graph and the table were given as hard copies,
and the interactive tool was a numbered line on each principal’s computer screen.
The signal received by the principal in a round was pointed as the max value for the
object on the numbered line. The principal could slide a black square between zero
and the max value. The computer reported the corresponding unconstrained bid
of the principal’s computerized bidder every time the principal dropped the black
square at a possible actual value on the line. We told the subjects that this tool is
provided to help them understand the bidding strategy of the computerized bidders
unless they were constrained by the principals bid caps. An example of the com-
puter screen of a principal with computerized bidder can be seen in the instructions
provided in Appendix A.
The role of a subject in the control treatments was to decide on her bid cap
after observing her signal for the round. Once each principal submitted her bid cap,
the corresponding computerized bidder bids the minimum of the unconstrained bid
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corresponding to the actual value observed by the computerized bidder and the bid
cap set by the principal.
All the amounts in experiment were in Experimental Currency Units (ECU).
Subjects received $8 as initial endowment to cover any possible losses in the experi-
ment. The principals were more subject to potential losses since they did not know
their values at the time of decision making. No subject lost all of the initial endow-
ment. The final earnings of a subject was the sum of her payoffs in 25 rounds in
addition to the initial endowment. The payoffs in the experiment were converted to
US dollars at the conversion rate of 20 ECU=$1 (for the principals) and 80 ECU=$1
(for the agents).9 Our calculations based on equilibrium predicted four times higher
payoffs for the principals than the agents in their variable payoffs. This was because
of the difference between the valuations of principals and the agents for the same
auctioned item. Hence we set different conversion rates to make the earnings of
subjects playing different roles comparable. By interpreting the sigma in footnote
2 as the conversion rate, one may note that the theory is independent of the con-
version rates.10 Cash payments were made at the conclusion of the experiment in
private. The average principal and agent payments were $23 and $25 (including $7
participation fee).
9 We are confident that using different exchange rates does not alter our findings since our
findings in the main treatments and in the control treatments (where the agents are computerized
and therefore there is only principals’ exchange rate) are qualitatively the same.
10 An alternative method to balance the earnings of principals and bidders could be to provide
them with different endowments. We did not use this method since it could make some subjects
think that they were less favored by the experimenter.
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3.4 Experimental Results
The analysis presented in this section is based on 500 auctions we conducted
per auction format with human bidders and 1000 auctions we conducted per auction
format with computerized bidders. We specify it when we disregard some data.
While testing differences between treatments, we report Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
statistics for the session averages assuming that session averages are independent.11
We start by studying the strategies of principals in treatments with and with-
out computerized bidders. We compare the bid caps submitted in the first- and
second-price auctions with the equilibrium budgets. Figure 3.4 (same as Figure 3.1)
shows the principals’ choices of budgets across all sessions in first- and second-price
auctions when we have human bidders. The figure shows box plots of the budgets12
for each of ten bins based on the signal observed by the principals. Figure 3.5 shows
the same plot for the budgets submitted in treatments with computerized bidders.
The most basic prediction of the theory is that the principals choose lower
budgets in the first-price auction. In particular for the parameters used in the





s = 0.625s, in the second-price auction and wFP (s) ∼ 35128s ∼ 0.273s , in the
11 We also performed t-statistics by using each observation and the results were not qualitatively
different in any of the comparisons.
12 The box plots were created using standard techniques. The white lines represent the median;
the box represents the interquartile range (IQR); the whiskers extend to the furthest data point
within 1.5*IQR; and the open circles are individual data points outside 1.5*IQR. In Figure 3.4, 24
out of 28 of the outliers in the second-price auction represent decisions made by one subject.
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Fig. 3.4: Budgets in First- and Second-Price Auctions with Human Bidders
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Fig. 3.5: Budgets in First- and Second-Price Auctions with Computerized Bidders
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first-price auction.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 clearly suggest that in the experiment, the principals set
relatively lower budgets in first-price settings with and without human bidders,
respectively. In order to further study the difference between the budgeting deci-
sions of the principals in different auction formats statistically, we first run session-
level fixed-effect and individual-level random-effect regressions of budgets set by the
principals on the signals. The regression coefficients in Table 3.1 indicate that the
principals in the first-price auctions set lower caps than the ones participating in
second-price auctions for a given signal.13 The estimated coefficients of signal are
0.743 in SP and 0.429 in FP with human bidders. They are 0.899 in SP and 0.397
in FP with computerized bidders.
There are several ways to characterize the behavior of the principals, but per-
haps the most straight-forward is to examine the budget decided on as a fraction
of their signal. This completely describes the behavior of the principals if they
are choosing budgets that are linear functions of their signals (with zero intercept).
Many of the principals’ decisions in the data can be characterized by linear strate-
gies, and note that equilibrium prescribes that the principals should be using linear
strategies in the second-price auction and approximately linear strategies in the first-
price auction. To quantify the fit of linear strategies, we calculated the R2 values
13 We also estimated these regressions controlling for the round number by including dummy
variables indicating the first 10 rounds of the experiment in each treatment but these dummy
variables were not significant at the 5% level and did not affect the estimates of interest when they




















Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
Tab. 3.1: Regressions of Budget on Principal Signal
from regressions of the budget on the principal signals for each individual principal.
For principals in the first-price auction, 75% of the principals had R2 values above
0.79, 50% were above 0.87 and 25% were above 0.93. The corresponding numbers
in the second-price auction were 0.87, 0.94 and 0.97. With computerized bidders in
the first-price auction (second-price auction), 75% of the principals had R2 values
above 0.72 (0.79), 50% were above 0.86 (0.92), and 25% were above 0.93 (0.96).
If we calculate a session average value of budget/signal for each principal and
use a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test to compare these fractions between the first-
and the second-price auctions, we reject the hypothesis that the fractions in the
first-price treatment are at least as high as those in the second-price treatment (p
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= 0.004 when we have human bidders and p=0.004 when we have computerized
bidders).15 Figures 3.6(a) and 3.6(b) show the empirical density estimates of the
average fractions for human and computerized bidders, respectively. In addition to
showing the raw data (dashed line), we show the densities of the average budget
fractions for each subject (solid line). In both figures, we have excluded data where
the average fraction exceeds 2 to emphasize the range where most of the data is
concentrated. In Figure 3.6(a), 0.1% of the raw first-price data (mean of 6.11) and
2.3% of the raw second-price data (mean of 46.22) is not shown. In Figure 3.6(b),
0.1% of the first-price data (mean of 4.79) and 9.7% of the second-price data (mean
of 4.77) is not shown. The larger number of outliers in this last case is evident in
Figure 3.5 above.16 The vertical lines mark the equilibrium predictions (recall that
this is approximate in the first-price case).
The theory predicts that the principals set the same cutoff value for the bidders
in both auctions. This means that a principal who observed signal s will set the
budget so that the set of types of bidders for whom the constraint binds are the
same. More precisely, we calculate that cutoff type as s
2−δ ∼ 0.625s. This result of
15 Note that we continue to reject this hypothesis if we exclude the first session of the second-price
treatment. The subject who set the outlier budget levels in Figure 3.4 participated in that session.
16 The larger fraction of outliers evident in the second-price treatments might be the result of the
noisier feedback from the second-price design. The negative consequence of setting a high budget
in either treatment is that one might have to (possibly) pay too high of a price for the item. In the
first-price auction, the realization of this consequence requires that ones bidder also place a high
bid, but in the second-price auction ones bidder must place a high bid and ones opponent must
have a high budget and place a high bid.
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(a) Human Bidders (b) Computerized Bidders
Fig. 3.6: Empirical densities of (budget/signal) in all treatments
course depends on the bidders using equilibrium strategies for their bid functions.
In the computerized bidder treatment, we are able to invert the bid functions used
by the bidders to infer the principals’ choice of cutoff type. To infer the cutoff type
of the human bidders would involve making assumptions about the unconstrained
behavior of the human bidders. Therefore, in the following analysis of the cutoff
type, we only consider the computerized bidder treatment.
Given the inferred cutoff type choice in the computerized bidder treatment,
we ran the following regression using t̂ for the inferred cutoff type.
t̂i = β0 + β1FP + β2Signali + β3(FPi × Signali) +Dγ + εis
The term Dγ represents session dummies to control for fixed effects at the
session level. Including session-level fixed effects, prevents us from separately iden-
tifying β0 and β1, so these coefficients are not reported below. The s subscript in the
62
error term indicates that there are subject-level effects included in the error term.
Specifically we assume that
εis = us + bsSignali + vi
where us is a subject-level random effect, bs is a random coefficient also at the
subject level, and vi is a noise term. This specification allows for the subjects to
have random, though uncorrelated, deviations in both the slope and the intercept
terms. It also provides a way to explicitly model the heteroskedasticity in the data.
This formulation also seems appropriate for this data as many of the subjects seem
to be playing linear strategies. The results from the regression are below.17
Neither the likelihood ratio tests nor Wald tests on the significance of the null
hypothesis β3 = 0 reject at the 1% level for the experiments with computerized
bidders. Therefore, the principals in FP and SP auctions do not constrain signifi-
cantly different types of bidders when the bidders are computerized although they
constrain a smaller set of bidder types than the equilibrium predicts.
17 These regressions were also performed with controls for potential round effects. When a dummy
for the first 10 rounds is included in the regressions, the coefficient on this dummy is positive and
significant for the first-price treatment (but insignificant for the second-price treatment) suggesting
that cutoff types were lower on average in the later rounds of the first-price treatment; however,
including these controls affected neither the values of the β2 or β3 (in both cases the estimates















Tab. 3.2: Cutoff type regression
3.4.1 Revenue and Efficiency
The theory predicts that the principals choose to constrain the same set of
types in both auction formats, and this leads to the revenue equivalence result.
Revenue equivalence is, however, sensitive to the particular set of types the principals
constrain. In our experiment, the principals constrain the fewer types than the
theory predicts and in both formats the constrained types are the same. Moreover,
as argued earlier the principals’ behavior in the experiment is linear. The proposition
below shows that the first-price is expected to raise higher revenue than the second-
price if the principals’ deviation from the equilibrium has these properties.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the principals choose cutoff types according to linear
strategies that constrain fewer types than equilibrium (i.e. t̂ (s) = αs with α > 5/8).
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Then the first-price auction raises more revenue than the second-price auction with
computerized bidders.
The results on seller revenue generated in four treatments as well as the equi-
librium predictions based on the used draws are in Table 3.3. Aggregating average
revenue to the session level, we performed Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests that the
session averages came from distributions with the same median. In line with Propo-
sition 1, in the treatments with human bidders, the tests rejected this hypothesis
between the first- and second-price auctions (p = 0.008). The hypothesis is rejected
between the first-price auction and equilibrium (p = 0.008) as well. The test did
not reject at the 5% significance level between the second-price auction and equi-
librium (p = 0.095). In the treatments with computerized bidders, the results were
roughly the same. The test rejects the hypothesis between the first- and second-
price auctions (p = 0.032) and between the first-price auction and equilibrium (p
= 0.008). The test did not reject at the 5% level between the second-price auction
and equilibrium (p = 0.056).
Next we analyze the efficiency of allocation in the main treatments. Tables 3.4
and 3.5 summarize the rates of efficiency by using two different efficiency measures
for human and computerized bidders cases, respectively. The first row is the per-
centages of auctions where the winning principal has the higher valuation. The
second row is the average surplus that is realized. This measure is defined as the
winning principal’s value divided by the highest value of the two principals. The







24.332 17.043 18.061 16.956
(0.658) (0.173) (0.402) (0.363)
Computerized Bidders
23.15 16.653 18.81 16.648
(1.064) (0.194) (0.875) (0.192)
Standard errors of session means are in the parenthesis






Rate of efficient allocations
0.850 0.874 0.804 0.874
(0.021) (0.010) (0.023) (0.010)
Realized Surplus
0.946 0.961 0.923 0.961
(0.008) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003)
Standard errors of session means are in the parenthesis
Tab. 3.4: Efficiency in the treatments with human bidders
Using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test and a significance level of
5%, the average rate of efficient allocations is not significantly different between
first- and second-price (p = 0.205) or the first-price and equilibrium (p = 0.396),
or the second-price and equilibrium (p = 0.057). Using MWW and a significance
level of 5%, the average realized surplus is not significantly different between first-
and second-price (p = 0.151), or the first-price and equilibrium (p = 0.222), but is
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significantly different between the second-price and equilibrium (p = 0.008).
The results on the efficiency of the allocations in the treatments with comput-
erized bidders are presented in Table 3.5. There is no significant difference between
first-price and second-price with respect to either measure and none of them are






Rate of efficient allocations
0.863 0.852 0.855 0.852
(0.017) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Realized Surplus
0.952 0.955 0.950 0.955
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Standard errors of session means are in the parenthesis
Tab. 3.5: Efficiency in the control treatments
Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that having computerized bidders who play
the equilibrium strategies or not do not alter the relative performance of the formats
in terms of efficiency and revenue.
Finally, we study the bidders’ behavior in the experiment. One way to evaluate
the behavior of the bidders is to do the following test. First, the theory predicts
that each bidder’s value pins down their choice of unconstrained bid. So we can
calculate each bidder’s predicted choice conditional on the budget given to them in
the experiment as the minimum of the predicted unconstrained bid and the observed
budget. We then compare the distribution of this value to the observed bids using a
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and find that the test does not reject the null hypothesis
that the distributions are the same at the 5% level (p-values are 0.969 for both
auctions). This suggests that the results on revenue and efficiency are driven by the
differences in budgeting behavior of the principals.
3.5 Conclusion
Prior to Vickrey [1961], it might well have been commonplace for observers to
wonder, “Why would a seller ever want to use a second-price, rather than a first-
price auction? Given any set of bids, the seller would always do better to charge the
winner the highest bid.” The obvious oversight is in not taking into account that
bidding behavior is affected by a change in the rules.
It seems to us that the literature on budget constraints often makes a similar
oversight. When budget constraints are present, they can be presumed to exist for
a reason; quite likely, they arise from a principal-agent problem. When a principal
imposes a budget on an agent, the principal should determine a budget appropriate
for the auction format. Just like the bidding behavior, the principals actions to
constrain the bidding behavior should also be affected by a change in the rules.
In this paper, we found clear experimental evidence that principals set demon-
strably lower budgets for bidders when the format will be a first-price, rather than
second-price auction. This holds true robustly, both with human bidders and with
computerized bidders.
The endogeneity of budgets may be helpful in explaining one of the main
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predictive failures of the literature on auctions with budget constraints. Recall not
only that the literature predicts the second-price auction to be outperformed by the
first-price auction, but it predicts both formats to be outperformed by the all-pay
auction. Nevertheless, while the all-pay auction is a good model for phenomena such
as political lobbying, the all-pay format is hardly ever used for conventional sales of
valuable assets. Perhaps sellers recognize that the principals would neutralize the
effect of the all-pay auction by imposing even more stringent budget constraints on
their bidders.
While the first-price auction generated higher revenues in our experiments,
this came about for a different reason than in the literature with exogenous budget
constraints. In the literature, the higher revenues resulted from budgets that were
the same, for different auction formats. In our experiments with endogenous budget
constraints, the higher revenues resulted from subjects setting higher budgets than
in the equilibrium solutions, both with second-price and first-price formats. Our
experimental design is not well suited for finding what motivated the setting of
higher-than-equilibrium budgets; this is an interesting question for future research.
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4. ALLOCATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND EFFICIENCY IN
SEALED-BID AND SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
by Justin E. Burkett
4.1 Introduction
When auctions involve firms as participants, the outcome likely affect the
structure of some downstream market, and the firms’ expectations about this down-
stream interaction presumably affects their valuations of the good being auctioned.
In some important cases the firms’ valuations will be affected by the identities of
the winners and losers in the auction. For example, the auction may determine
whether or not a new entrant is allowed into a market and the incumbents would
be adversely affected by the additional competition. In an auction without possi-
ble new entrants, a bidder may consider some bidders as stronger competitors than
others. In a market with significant switching costs between incompatible products,
competition is likely stronger between firms producing compatible products than it
is between firms with incompatible products [Klemperer, 1995].
In this environment, revealing the identity of winners midway through the
auction may have important implications for auction outcomes. This paper charac-
terizes the implications for the auction’s efficiency by comparing a sealed-bid format,
where the winners are not revealed until the end of the auction to a sequential for-
mat, where winners’ identities are revealed during the course of the auction. I also
discuss a related issue, that defining efficiency in this environment is potentially
problematic. For example, one allocation may maximize social surplus by choosing
the bidders with the lowest cost of production, but not maximize the bidders’ ex-
post payoffs (producer surplus). The auction literature focuses on the second, but
if we are considering an auction run by the government these two ideas need not
coincide. For example, some allocations may lead to very competitive markets that
benefit consumers but not the firms.
Auctions where the bidders care about the identities of the winners and losers,
insofar as the identities enter into their valuation functions, fall into the category
of auctions with externalities. Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu have written
a number of papers on the difficulties that arise in auctions with externalities and
provide a general overview of the literature in Jehiel and Moldovanu [2006]. In the
presence of externalities several important complications arise that do not appear in
standard auction models. For example, efficient allocation mechanisms do not exist
except in special cases [Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001].
One can distinguish between informational externalities, where bidders possess
relevant information about the other bidders’ valuations,1 and allocative (or identity-
dependent) externalities, where bidders care about the identities of the winners and
losers.
1 Milgrom and Weber [1982] is an early example of an auction with informational externalities.
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Specifically, this paper considers the problem of selling two units of a homo-
geneous good to bidders who care about the identity of the winner of the other unit
(i.e. there are allocative externalities). The participants have private information
about a parameter determining their costs of production and value the good dif-
ferently depending on the identity and cost parameter of the other winning bidder.
The setup allows for multiple interpretations for efficiency, because it is not assumed
that the producer surplus maximizing allocations always coincide with the ones that
maximize social surplus. A seller who is therefore interested in allocating the goods
to the bidders with the lowest production costs is not always interested in allocating
to the bidders with the highest expected profit.
I focus on two standard auction formats, a sealed-bid, uniform price auction
where the goods are allocated to the highest bidders at a price equal to the highest
rejected bid, and sequential auctions where one unit of the good is sold in each
round at a price equal to the second highest bidder in that round. The key difference
between the two formats is that one reveals the identity of the winner of the first
unit.2 This fact leads to the result in this model that while the sealed-bid format
in equilibrium selects the participant with the lowest cost, the sequential format is
more likely to select the set of participants with higher joint profits. This suggests
that the social surplus maximizing seller would prefer the sealed-bid format in this
environment.
The impact of allocative externalities on auction design has been considered
2 Of course, this is an assumption. One could imagine a sequential format where the winner of
the first unit is not revealed to the remaining participants.
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in several papers including Jehiel et al. [1999], Aseff and Chade [2004], Das Varma
[2002a,b], and Das Varma and Lopomo [2010]. Jehiel et al. [1999] develop an optimal
mechanism to sell one unit of a good when bidders are privately informed about
their vector of payoffs when each of the other bidders is a winner. They show that
the endogenous participation constraints along with the multidimensional private
information have interesting implications for the optimal choice of reserve price.
The optimal reserve price is never small, for example, it is either zero or much
larger than zero. Aseff and Chade [2004] also consider revenue maximizing design
for a two good auction.3
This paper is most closely related to a series of papers by Das Varma and
coauthors [Das Varma, 2002a,b, Das Varma and Lopomo, 2010] that analyze an
environment where a single good is auctioned in an environment where some of the
bidders experience allocative externalities when the good is won by an opponent of
a given type. They find that an ascending format can raise more revenue in this
environment than a sealed-bid format [Das Varma, 2002a]; revealing the identities
of the bidders can generally increase the efficiency, defined in terms of bidders’
willingness to pay, and revenue performance of the auction [Das Varma, 2002b]; but
that when considered as a model of entry, the sealed-bid format (i.e. a format which
does not reveal bidders’ identities) may be more efficient because the dynamic format
in their model introduces a free riding effect among incumbents causing strategic
non-participation [Das Varma and Lopomo, 2010].
3 See also Figueroa and Skreta [2009] and Brocas [2007] for more examples of revenue maximizing
mechanism design in this type of environment.
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The theme throughout these papers is that revealing the identity of the bidders
to other bidders, either directly or through a dynamic auction procedure can have
important implications for the performance of standard mechanisms. This paper
continues with this idea and extends the analysis to an environment where multiple
goods are auctioned and the assumptions made on the payoffs and information
structure are weaker. For instance, my model allows for payoffs to depend on the cost
information of the opponents and does not impose strong distributional assumptions.
Another significant difference is in the assumptions about how the externalities are
transmitted. In this paper, the externalities affect the payoffs of other winners, but
are not assumed to affect the losers of the auction in a non-uniform way.4
This paper is also related to the IO literature on monopolists’ deterrence of
entry [e.g. Gilbert and Newberry, 1982]. For example, Krishna [1993] argues that
when resources are auctioned off sequentially rather than all at once there can be
a tendency for a monopolists position to weaken over time, because the monopolist
can strategically reduce the cost of acquiring those resources over time by waiting
to purchase. In a related paper, Gale and Stegeman [2001] present a model where
duopolists sequentially acquire goods and show that in their model the modal pre-
diction is that the duopolists split the goods unevenly, and this result is driven in
part by a strategic advantage to winning goods early in the sequence of auctions.
Both of these results provide contrast to the results of Gilbert and Newberry [1982]
4 In other words, if there is an impact on the losers of the auction, through post-auction inter-
action perhaps, this impact affects all of the losing bidders in the same way, irrespective of their
identity.
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that suggest that a monopolist tends to preempt entry when allowed to bid on the
rights to a new innovation. Whereas these papers develop models of complete infor-
mation, my paper is concerned with an incomplete information model. I also do not
focus on market concentration but rather on the efficiency of the auction outcomes.
Other related papers in this literature include Rodriguez [2002], who considers
a sequence of license auctions to firms participating in a post-auction market where
all the bidders enter the same market and there is complete information. Kat-
senos [2008] considers a similar model to mine comparing sealed-bid and sequential
auctions in an incomplete information model, but also assumes that all bidders par-
ticipate in the same post-auction market. In other words, there is no difference in
the identities of the bidders in his model, whereas that is the focus of the current
paper.
The next section will describe the model, and the following section presents
the results, first for the sealed-bid auction then for the sequential auction.
4.2 Model
There are 2N (N ≥ 3) bidders competing in an auction for two homogeneous
goods. Each bidder demands at most one of the goods and has a valuation that
depends on the type of the other winner. Bidders may be one of two types, A and
B, each of which is represented by N bidders in the auction. The types of bidder are
assumed to be common knowledge among the bidders. Since I restrict attention the
use of anonymous mechanisms for the seller, I do not take a stance on whether the
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seller can observe the type or not. It could be that the seller must use an anonymous
mechanism because from her perspective the bidders are identical ex-ante.
I assume that winning the good allows each of the bidders to produce in a
downstream market, and the expected profits from the market determine each firm’s
willingness to pay for a good. For example, the goods might represent licenses for
wireless spectrum. The profit is determined as a function of a firm’s costs, ci, and
the costs and type of the firm that wins the other unit.
Suppose that the type of the firms, A or B, represents the market that the
firms will compete in, so if two firms of type A win goods at the auction they will
compete against each other in market A, but if an A and a B win, they will be
monopolists in the downstream markets A and B. Formally, suppose that each
firm has a parameter ci that determines its cost of production and that an A firm
(firm i) receives a payoff πA,A(ci, cj) if it wins with firm j and firm j is an A firm,
and a payoff of πA,B(ci, ck) if it wins with firm k and firm k is a B firm. I assume
throughout that all the payoff functions, π, are continuous, strictly decreasing in
their first argument, and strictly increasing in their second argument. I make the
following assumptions on the payoff functions (assumed to hold for all ci, cj):
A1 πA,A(ci, cj) < πA,B(ci, cj)
A2 πA,A(ci, cj) = πB,B(ci, cj)
A3 πA,B(ci, cj) = πB,A(ci, cj)
A4 πA,B(ci − d, cj)− πA,B(ci, cj) ≥ πA,B(ci, cj)− πA,B(ci, cj − d)
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A4’ πA,A(ci − d, cj)− πA,A(ci, cj) ≥ πA,A(ci, cj)− πA,A(ci, cj − d)
Assumption 1 says that an A bidder would prefer to win against an B bidder
over an A bidder with the same cost. One way to think about this assumption is
that all A firms produce goods that are close substitutes to each other, while the
goods produced by B firms are not close substitutes for each A’s good. Keeping
the wireless spectrum example, it could be that the market (A or B) represents the
region of the country the firm operates in.
Assumptions 2 and 3 are symmetry assumptions, implying that there is noth-
ing inherently different about being an A or B type. Assumption 3 also allows me
to not distinguish between the allocations {A,B} and {B,A}.
Assumption 4 and 4’ say that reducing a firm’s own cost by d increases the
payoff more that increasing that firm’s opponent’s cost by d. Roughly, one’s own
costs are more important that one’s rival’s.
I normalize the payoffs of the bidders who lose the auction to 0. This is an
important distinction between this model and the model of Das Varma [2002a], for
example. In that paper the reservation value of the bidders depends on the type
of the winning bidder. When losing bidders suffer negative externalities, they are
willing to bid above their valuation to prevent their rivals from winning. In a model
where all the bidders expect to interact in a downstream market it is likely that
losers in the auction will care about the identity of the winning bidder.
This paper does not examine this effect, or in other words, assumes that the
firms’ outside opportunities are unaffected (or affected uniformly) by the outcome of
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the auction. This paper focuses on the interaction between an auction for multiple
units of a good and bidders’ expectations about the likely winners in the even that
they win one of the units. Since Das Varma [2002a] is a model of a one unit auction
it cannot capture this interaction.
Costs are assumed to be private information to each firm and distributed
independently according to some commonly known distribution, F (c) on a closed
interval, [0, 1]. For convenience, I assume that the distribution function is strictly
increasing on its domain (i.e. there are no gaps).
As an illustration of the above assumptions, the following example describes a
simple version of a model of competition when consumers have switching costs, and
is a slight modification of Example 0 in Klemperer [1995]. Switching costs are costs
that consumers incur when switching from being a Firm A customer to a Firm B
customer, and may be the result of compatibility differences between products or
simply transaction costs [for an overview see Farrell and Klemperer, 2007].
Example 1. Suppose that firms of type A manufacture products that are compatible
with those of other type A firms but incompatible with products made by a type B
firm. Assuming N consumers have a reservation price of R for one unit of a good.
A fraction σA of consumers must pay a switching cost of s to buy from a B firm,
while a fraction σB = 1− σA pay s to buy from A.
If an A and a B type firm are in the market (with marginal costs cA and cB),
s ≥ R− cA > 0, and s ≥ R− cB > 0, then in the unique non-cooperative equilibrium
the firms price the goods as if they were monopolists in their respective markets
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(pA = pB = R) and earn profits πA(cA, cB) = σAN(R − cA) and πB(cB, cA) =
σBN(R− cB).
If there are two As in the market (with marginal costs cA1 and c
A
2 ), the firms
compete for the share of customers in their segment (if min{cA1 , cA2 } ≥ R− s so the
B customers are not served). Under price competition the higher cost firm (firm 1)
earns 0 and the lower cost firm (firm 2) earns πA(cA2 , c
A
1 ) = σ
AN(cA1 − cA2 ).
I first compare the outcomes of a sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction and sequential
second-price auctions in this environment.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Sealed-Bid Auction
Consider the problem of a seller in this environment who would like to maxi-
mize social surplus and allocate to the most efficient firms, the one’s with the lowest
cost. In the first case, consider the sealed-bid auction with Vickrey pricing rule,
where the seller collects bids, awards the objects to the two highest bidders, and
charges them the value of the third highest bid.
The Vickrey auction rules suggest that it is an equilibrium for the bidders
to report their expected value for a good, and it is. However, with externalities
the value of the good depends on the expected allocation, and in equilibrium the
bidders’ expected values have to be consistent with the allocation rule (they have
to be correct about their expectations).
There is an symmetric equilibrium in this model, however, because from any
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bidder’s perspective there are N − 1 bidders of the same type and N bidders of
the other type. By symmetric equilibrium I mean that the bids depend on costs
symmetrically for each of the types of firms, or in other words, that bids are functions
of costs and not types.
Proposition 2. The unique symmetric equilibrium of the sealed-bid Vickrey auction
















B refer to the lowest of the N − 1 A firms and N B firms
respectively.
















B now refer to the lowest of the N A firms and N − 1
B firms respectively.
Proof. See Appendix
In words, this means that the bidders’ bid according to the weighted expected
value of competing against an bidder of the same type and a bidder of the other
type in the downstream market. Since these forms are symmetric between A and B
firms, the firms submitting the highest bids must be the firms with the lowest costs
irrespective of type.
Corollary 3. In a symmetric equilibrium the sealed-bid Vickrey auction allocates
to the two firms with the lowest cost, irrespective of their identities.
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The efficiency of this auction format depends on how we define efficiency in
this environment. Although the auction allocates to the firms with the lowest cost,
it does not always allocate to the firms with the largest ex-post valuation. This is

























Continuity of the payoff functions and the assumptions on the cost distribution
imply that this event has positive probability.
In other words, my assumptions allow for the lowest cost firms to win the
object, and not have the highest ex-post valuations. If the auction allocates to an




































The first inequality follows from Assumption A4, and the second follows from
A1. What A4 is ruling out essentially is that given the allocation {A,B} we can
increase the firms’ joint payoff by replacing a low cost firm with a higher cost one.
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4.3.2 Sequential Auction
I next consider a sequential auction where the identity and bid of the winner of
the first auction is known to those bidding in the second auction. The two auctions
are assumed to be standard second-price auctions. There are two reasons for making
this choice. The first is tractability. Note that in the second stage the environment
becomes asymmetric as the valuations no longer have the same distribution across
types, and it is well known that closed form solutions to the asymmetric first-price
auction are only known in special cases. The second is that the second-price auction
is the Vickrey auction for a single good, and is therefore, the natural sequential
auction to compare to the sealed-bid Vickrey auction.
Again, the symmetry of the environment in the first stage suggests looking
for a symmetric equilibrium in the first stage, meaning that the first stage bids are
determined by costs and not identities. The first step is to recognize that in the
second auction we are in an environment with private values and no externalities.5 It
is an equilibrium in the second stage, therefore, for the bidders to bid their expected
value if they win the good.
The derivation of first round bid strategies is based on the idea that the bidders
would not be willing to pay more than their expected payment in the second round
(conditional on winning), because for a given realization of opponents’ costs if in
equilibrium they win in the first round, they could always lower their bid and win
in the second round. The full details are given in the appendix.
5 Implicitly I am assuming here that the winning bid is revealed from the first stage of the
auction and that the second round bidders can use this information to back out the winners cost.
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To state the following proposition, I need to define the following five events.
The events are defined from the perspective of an A type bidder, and I use c to
represent the vector of realized costs for all bidders. The analogous events for a
type B bidder are not shown.
E1(cA) =
{
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(1)












































In four of these events (1,2,4 and 5), the A bidder loses the first auction and
wins the second auction. In the fifth (E3), the A bidder loses the second auction
despite having the second lowest cost because of the externality imposed by an
A bidder winning the first auction. With these events defined, I can state the
equilibrium bid functions.
Proposition 3. With sequential second-price auctions, there is an equilibrium where
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an A bidder in the first round bids according to
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A ) if an A wins the first good
πA,B(c, c
(1)
B ) if a B wins the first good
B bidders’ equilibrium bid functions are defined analogously, and importantly are
symmetric in the first round.
Although complicated, the equilibrium bid functions have a simple interpreta-
tion. A bidder bids her expected second round payment in the first round and her
(known) value in the second round.
Returning to the question of efficiency, it is interesting to observe that because
the first round bid functions are symmetric between the types the first good must
go to the bidder with the lowest cost. However, once the first good is assigned, the
second auction need not allocate to the lowest cost firm.
Corollary 4. In a symmetric equilibrium, the sequential second-price auctions al-
locate the first good to the lowest cost firm, but the second good may or may not go
to the firm with the second lowest cost.
Combining these observations with the ones from the sealed-bid auction, it is
clear that a seller interested in allocating the goods to the lowest cost firms (perhaps
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because this would maximize total surplus in the market) should prefer the sealed-
bid format over the sequential format in this environment. The reason is simple. The
sealed-bid format does not allow the bidders to condition their bids on information
about the realized identities of the other winner, while the sequential auction does.
As with the sealed-bid format, if the sequential format allocates one good
each to an A and B bidder then the allocation must also maximize the ex-post
valuations of the bidders. The reasoning is not exactly the same as in the sealed-bid
case though. In the second round of the sequential auction the bidders know their
ex-post valuations, so the second round must select the highest ex-post valuation
from among the second round bidders. However, when the second round selects a
bidder of the same type as the first round, the valuation of the first round bidder is
affected (negatively) through the externality.
So if in the second round after the first good has been allocated to an A the
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However, when the second good goes to an A (after an A wins the first round),
the first round winner’s payoff is reduced and this can lead to an allocation that
does not maximize the ex-post payoffs of the bidders.
The next proposition will show that it must be that the sequential auction
maximizes the ex-post valuations of the bidders more often than the sealed-bid
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auction. For this proposition, I introduce the following notion of efficiency, where in
this application efficiency means maximization of the bidders’ ex-post valuations.
Definition 1. Let Ei be the union of events in which auction i allocates the goods
inefficiently. Auction 1 is called more efficient than auction 2 if E1 ⊆ E2. It is
strictly more efficient if E1 ⊂ E2.
Using this definition of efficiency, I can now state
Proposition 4. With efficiency understood to mean maximization of ex-post val-
uations, it must be that the sequential auction is more efficient than the sealed-bid
auction.
Proof. Let ES (ESB, respectively) be the events in which the sequential auction
(sealed-bid auction) does not maximize the ex-post valuations of the bidders. I
need to show that ES ⊆ ESB. As discussed above, both auctions maximize the
ex-post valuations when the goods are allocated to bidders of different types. So I
restrict attention to realizations that lead to allocations to the same type. Without
loss of generality I consider cases where the allocation is to two A bidders. ES is




























































The only difference is the addition of the third inequality for ESB. So it must be
that ESB ⊆ ES.
To summarize the results of this section, I have shown that in this model a
seller interested in allocating the goods to the firms with the lowest cost prefers to
run a sealed-bid auction, which always allocates to the bidders with the lowest cost
realizations (this is not true for the sequential format). Next I have shown that the
sequential format is always more likely to allocate to the bidders with the highest ex-
post allocations. Therefore, these two notions of efficiency lead to opposite results
in this model.
4.4 Conclusion
The results show that a seller interested in allocating to firms with the lowest
cost would prefer to run a sealed-bid Vickrey auction over a sequential auction in this
environment. The typical definition of efficiency prescribes that a seller maximize
the ex-post valuations of the bidders, and in this environment a seller prefers a
sequential auction in this case. This second result agrees with the spirit of the Das
Varma [2002b], who shows that a seller auctioning a single good in an environment
with allocative externalities can raise revenue and expected efficiency by revealing
the identities of bidders.
The implication of this paper is that revealing information about bidders
through a sequential auction format harms the ability of the auction to allocate
to the bidders with the lowest cost. It is interesting to note that one criticism of
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dynamic auction formats is that they may allow for bidders to implement collusive
strategies [Klemperer, 2004]. This paper provides another rationale that is closely
related, when there are allocative externalities there need not be any “active” col-
lusion for the sequential format to favor the bidders.
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APPENDIX
A. CHAPTER THREE SUPPORTING MATERIALS
A.1 Derivation of Equilibrium
Let t represent the valuation of the bidder, δt represent the valuation of the
principal, and s represent the signal received by the principal. The distributions of
these random variables in the experiment are







δt ∼ U [0, s]




0 ≤ s ≤ 100
f (t | s) = δ
s
0 ≤ t ≤ s
δ
A.1.1 Second Price Auction
Let b2(t) be the bidder’s unconstrained choice of bid in the second price auc-
tion. It is a weakly dominant strategy in this environment for the bidder to set
b2 (t) = t.
Let w2(t) be the budget set by the principal. Since the bidder’s unconstrained
choice is the identity functions, the budget set by the principal is equivalently rep-
resented in terms of t as t̂2 (s) ≡ w2(s). Also let the density of the opposing bids











(δt− x) g (x) f (t | s) dx dt (A.1)
The first term represents the payoff in the event that the budget constraint









































∣∣ s) to make the left side a conditional expectation. The final
line is the principal’s equilibrium choice of t̂2, which in the second price auction is
also the equilibrium choice of budget constraint. The constrained bid submitted by
the bidder can be written as







Where it depends on both the bidder’s and the principal’s information.
A.1.2 First Price Auction
We give a brief treatment of the equilibrium derivation in the first price auction
and refer the reader to Burkett (2011) for a more complete treatment. The first
observation to make is that if the bidders choose unconstrained bids according to
some monotonic and continuous bid function b1(t), then for a choice of budget w1(s)




≡ w1(s). The eventual bid submitted






. If we define t̃1 ≡ min?{t, t̂1(s)},
then in a symmetric monotone equilibrium the bidder with the higher value of t̃1
will be the winner. Letting G(x) and g(x) represent the distribution and density







x g (x) dx
with G(x) playing the role of the usual type distribution. Now writing the principal’s
objective in terms of the choice of t̂1 we get∫ t̂2
0











f (t | s) dt






x g (x) dx
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x g (x) dx
)
f (t | s) dt
For a given G (x), this is the same objective as the one in the second price






















This makes the unconstrained bid function
b1 (x) =
(













A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose the principals choose a cutoff type strategy according to t̂α (s) = αs,
where in equilibrium α = α∗ = 5/8 in both auction formats, and let the distribution
of t̃α ≡ min {t, αs} be given by Gα (x) with G(i)α (x) being the distribution of the ith
order statistic. Finally, denote the equilibrium unconstrained bid function derived





y dGα∗(y). Then the experimental expected revenue




) and the second price auction (E[RSPα ]) with


















As the theory shows, with α = α∗ the two expressions are equal. Also, using a











where bα (x) is defined analogously to bα∗(x). So the first price auction raises more















(bα∗(x)− bα(x)) dG(1)a (x) > 0
In fact, one can show that for α > α∗ and all x > 0, bα∗ (x) > bα (x), so that






and Riley, 2000] and it is straightforward to verify that gα(x)
Gα(x)
decreases in α when
α∗ < α < 5/2. For gα(x)
Gα(x)












When α ≥ 5/2, the principal leaves the bidder unconstrained with probability 1 and
increases in α no longer affect gα(x)
Gα(x)






INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRST PRICE SEALED-BID AUCTIONS 
Thank you for being part of our research. Various research foundations have provided 
funds for this research. This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and, if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn 
a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
All values in the experiment will be in terms of Experimental Currency Unit (ECU). At the 
end of the experiment, we will convert your total earnings in the session to US$.  
• In this experiment, you will participate in a sequence of auctions. There will be 5 practice 
periods and 25 real periods. You will be paid only for the real periods. 
• At the beginning of the session, you will be assigned to one of the two types: A and B. 
• Your type is fixed throughout the experiment. 
• A single good will be auctioned off in each period. 
 
Matching in Each Period 
In each period, each type A subject will be randomly matched with a type B subject and 
form a team of two. Then each team will be randomly matched with another team of two 
subjects and then two teams will participate in an auction. You will never know whom you are 
matched. You will not be matched with the same group of subjects in any two consecutive 
periods.  
• Each team consists of a type A and a type B subjects.  
• Each team participates in an auction to obtain an auctioned good.  
• Two teams participate in an auction. 
Values  
For Type A subjects: 
At the beginning of each period, each type A subject privately observes her maximum 
possible value (MAX VALUE) for the auctioned good. MAX VALUE is a number randomly selected 
from the interval [0,100] and rounded to the nearest cent. Each number is equally likely.  The 
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MAX VALUEs of the two type A subjects in two teams that are participating in the same auction 
are independently determined and most likely different.  
Type A subject does not know her exact VALUE for the good at the time of decision making.  
All she knows is that her VALUE is a number contained in the interval [0, MAX VALUE]. 
Therefore, her VALUE is at minimum zero and cannot exceed her MAX VALUE. Again, any 
number between 0 and her MAX VALUE is equally likely.  For example, let’s say a type A subject 
receives a MAX VALUE of 45.32. Then her VALUE is uniformly distributed on interval [0, 45.32] 
and it can be any number less than or equal to 45.32. Let’s say her VALUE is 21.00. This means 
that if her team obtains the good at the end of the period, she will receive 21.00 ECU from us. 
 For Type B Subjects: 
 Each Type B subject knows the true value of her Type A teammate. Each Type B 
subject’s value for obtaining the good is 2.5 times her Type A teammate’s value. 
Type B’s Value = 2.5 x Type A’s Value 
Auction  
Each auction occurs in two stages. In the first stage only the Type A subjects will be active. In 
the second stage, only the Type B subjects are active. Specifically,  
Stage 1:  
• Each Type A only observes her MAX VALUE. Her true value is something less than this MAX 
VALUE. 
• Each Type A subject decides on a CAP which is the maximum amount she allows her type B 
teammate to bid.  
Stage 2: 
• Each Type B observes the exact value of the good for herself.  
• Each Type B also observes the CAP decided on by her Type A teammate. 
• Each Type B subject decides on how much she wants to bid in behalf of her team in the 




• After both teams participating in the auction submit their BIDs, the one who has the highest 
BID obtains the good and pays her BID. In case of a tie, each of the two participants in the 
auction will receive the good with equal probabilities.  
• This is the end of the period. 
 
• The following table summarizes the progression of stages 
 Team 1 Team 2 
 Type A Type B Type A Type B 
Stage 1 Sees: MAX 
VALUE 
Chooses: CAP 




Stage 2  Sees: CAP,VALUE 
Chooses: BID (≤ 
CAP) 
 Sees: CAP,VALUE 
Chooses: BID (≤ 
CAP) 
 
Earnings in a Period 
When your team obtains the good at the end of a period (if your BID is the highest), 
then you will receive your VALUE for the good and will pay the team’s BID. If your team does not 
obtain the good, you do not receive or pay any amount. In other words, your earnings in the 
current period are: 
Earnings = Your VALUE – Your BID       (If you obtained the auctioned good); 
 
Earnings = 0             (If you did not obtain the auctioned good). 
 
Recall that a Type B subject’s value is 2.5 times more than her Type A teammate. Moreover, at 
the time of decision making, each Type B subject knows her value. However, Type A subjects only 
know their maximum possible value but not their actual value. 
 
Sequence of Auctions: 
 When the current period is over, the next period will start. Each period, you will be 
randomly matched with a new teammate and participate in a new auction with a different 





Below, there is an example of how Type A’s and Type B’s screens may look.  
If you are a Type A subject, you see your MAX VALUE. Remember that this is the highest 
amount your actual value can be. You DON’T know your actual value before the auction is over. 






If you are a Type B subject, you see your value for the good and the CAP that your Type 
A teammate decided on. After observing your value, you will enter your BID in the text box on 






The screen below shows the information that a Type A person will see at the conclusion 
of a period. It displays Type A’s MAX VALUE, VALUE and CAP. Then it shows the BID that the 
Type B teammate decided on. It will also give you the BID of your opponent team and calculates 
the winner, the price of the good and your payoff for the round. Note that much of the 






The next screen shows the information that a Type B person will see at the conclusion of 
a period. It displays Type B’s VALUE, CAP and BID. It will also give you the BID of your opponent 
team and calculates the winner, the price of the good and your payoff for the round. Again, 





The tables below indicate all the MAX VALUEs, VALUEs and BIDs in an auction, and show 
the results for three different choices of a CAP. Recall that in the experiment Type A subjects will 
observe only their own MAX VALUEs and Type B subjects will observe their own VALUES. No 
subject will know the values received by the opponent team. 
1. 
 Team 1 
 (YOU) 
Team 2 
Type A’s MAX VALUE (observed by Type A) 84.62 37.40 
Type A’s VALUE 56.40 8.08 
Type A’s CAP 5.00 20.50 
Type B’s VALUE 141.00 20.20 
Type B’s BID 5.00 9.03 
Received Item No Yes 
Price N/A 9.03 
Type A’s Payoff 0 -0.95 
Type B’s Payoff 0 11.17 
2. 
 Team 1 
 (YOU) 
Team 2 
Type A’s MAX VALUE (observed by Type A) 84.62 37.40 
Type A’s VALUE 56.40 8.08 
Type A’s CAP 36.00 20.50 
Type B’s VALUE 141.00 20.20 
Type B’s BID 36.00 9.03 
Received Item Yes No 
Price 36.00 N/A 
Type A’s Payoff 20.40 0 






 Team 1 
 (YOU) 
Team 2 
Type A’s MAX VALUE (observed by Type A) 84.62 37.40 
Type A’s VALUE 56.40 8.08 
Type A’s CAP 70.00 20.50 
Type B’s VALUE 141.00 20.20 
Type B’s BID 59.44 9.03 
Received Item Yes No 
Price 59.44 N/A 
Type A’s Payoff -2.96 0 
Type B’s Payoff 81.56 0 
 
In all of the examples above, Type A of Team 2 (your opponent) observes a MAX VALUE 
of 37.40 and she decides on a CAP of 20.50. Team 2’s BID is 9.03.  
Type A of Team 1 observes a MAX VALUE of 84.62.  Her true value (which she does not 
know at the time of decision making), is 56.40. Therefore, the value of the Type B subject of 
Team 1 is 141 (2.5x56.40=141).  
Each of the three tables corresponds to different choices of CAP and BID for Team 1. In 
the first table, Type A chose a cap of 5.00 and Type B chose a BID of 5.00. 
In the first example the BIDs of two teams are 5.00 and 9.03. Since the highest bid (9.03) 
is submitted by Team 2, Team 2 obtains the good and pays its BID (9.03). In this period, the 
subjects in Team 1 earn zero, Type A of Team 2 earns 8.08 – 9.03 = -0.95 ECU, and Type B of 
Team 2 earns 20.20-9.03=11.17. Note that Type A of Team 2 loses money in this period because 
her Type B teammate is allowed to submit a bid that is higher than the Type A’s true value.  
In the second example, everything is the same except Type A of Team 1 choses a higher 
CAP (36.00) and Type B chooses a higher BID (36.00). Now Team 1 receives the item. The price is 
equal to the BID (36.00), so Type A of Team 1’s payoff is 56.40 – 36.00 = 20.40 ECU and Type B 
of Team 1’s payoff is 141.00-36.00=105.00 ECU. 
In the third example, Type A of Team 1’s CAP is now 70.00, and Type B’s BID is now 
59.44. The BIDs are 59.03 and 9.03. Team 1 receives the item for a price of 59.03, Type A’s 






At the beginning of today’s session both Type A and Type B subjects will receive an 
endowment of $8. The endowment is provided in order to cover any losses that you may make. 
Every period your earnings from that period are added to your initial endowment. At the end of 
today’s session you will receive your cumulative earnings —your earnings from 25 auctions plus 
your initial endowment. The conversion rate is $1 = 20 ECU for Type A and $1 = 80 ECU for Type 
B.  In addition to this sum, you will be paid a $7 participation fee. 
Are there any questions? 
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Practice Questions: Please answer the questions below. The experiment will start after 
everybody answers all the questions correctly. Please feel free to ask questions. 
1. Suppose a Type A subject observes a MAX VALUE of 76.00ECU. What is her possible VALUE?  
a) any value from 0 to 100.00  
b) any value from 0 to 76.00 
c) any value from 0 to 76.00 but not 76.00 
d) any value from 0 to 100.00 but not 76.00 
 
2. Suppose a Type A subject entered 21.00 as the CAP. What are the possible BIDs that the Type 
B subject in her team can select? 
a) Any BID is possible. 
b) Any BID that is between 0 and Type B’s VALUE is possible. 
c) Any BID that is between 0 and Type A’s VALUE is possible. 
d) Any BID that is between 0 and the CAP is possible. 
 
3. Fill the table below 
 Team 1 Team 2 
MAX VALUE (observed by Type A) 43.00 37.40 
Type A’s VALUE 4.00 10 
Type A’s CAP 38.00 21.00 
Type B’s VALUE   
Type B’s BID 6.00 8.00 
Received Item   
Price   
Type A’s Payoff   





INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECOND PRICE SEALED BID AUCTIONS 
Thank you for being part of our research. Various research foundations have provided 
funds for this research. This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and, if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn 
a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
All values in the experiment will be in terms of Experimental Currency Unit (ECU). At the 
end of the experiment, we will convert your total earnings in the session to US$.  
• In this experiment, you will participate in a sequence of auctions. There will be 5 practice 
periods and 25 real periods. You will be paid only for the real periods. 
• At the beginning of the session, you will be assigned to one of the two types: A and B. 
• Your type is fixed throughout the experiment. 
• A single good will be auctioned off in each period. 
 
Matching in Each Period 
In each period, each type A subject will be randomly matched with a type B subject and 
form a team of two. Then each team will be randomly matched with another team of two 
subjects and then two teams will participate in an auction. You will never know whom you are 
matched. You will not be matched with the same group of subjects in any two consecutive 
periods.  
• Each team consists of a type A and a type B subjects.  
• Each team participates in an auction to obtain an auctioned good.  
• Two teams participate in an auction. 
Values  
For Type A subjects: 
At the beginning of each period, each type A subject privately observes her maximum 
possible value (MAX VALUE) for the auctioned good. MAX VALUE is a number randomly selected 
from the interval [0,100] and rounded to the nearest cent. Each number is equally likely.  The 
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MAX VALUEs of the two type A subjects in two teams that are participating in the same auction 
are independently determined and most likely different.  
Type A subject does not know her exact VALUE for the good at the time of decision making.  
All she knows is that her VALUE is a number contained in the interval [0, MAX VALUE]. 
Therefore, her VALUE is at minimum zero and cannot exceed her MAX VALUE. Again, any 
number between 0 and her MAX VALUE is equally likely.  For example, let’s say a type A subject 
receives a MAX VALUE of 45.32. Then her VALUE is uniformly distributed on interval [0, 45.32] 
and it can be any number less than or equal to 45.32. Let’s say her VALUE is 21.00. This means 
that if her team obtains the good at the end of the period, she will receive 21.00 ECU from us. 
 For Type B Subjects: 
 Each Type B subject knows the true value of her Type A teammate. Each Type B 
subject’s value for obtaining the good is 2.5 times her Type A teammate’s value. 
Type B’s Value = 2.5 x Type A’s Value 
Auction  
Each auction occurs in two stages. In the first stage only the Type A subjects will be active. In 
the second stage, only the Type B subjects are active. Specifically,  
Stage 1:  
• Each Type A only observes her MAX VALUE. Her true value is something less than this MAX 
VALUE. 
• Each Type A subject decides on a CAP which is the maximum amount she allows her type B 
teammate to bid.  
Stage 2: 
• Each Type B observes the exact value of the good for herself.  
• Each Type B also observes the CAP decided on by her Type A teammate. 
• Each Type B subject decides on how much she wants to bid in behalf of her team in the 




• After both teams participating in the auction submit their BIDs, the one who has the highest 
BID obtains the good and pays her opponent’s BID. In case of a tie, each of the two 
participants in the auction will receive the good with equal probabilities.  
• This is the end of the period. 
 
• The following table summarizes the progression of stages 
 Team 1 Team 2 
 Type A Type B Type A Type B 
Stage 1 Sees: MAX 
VALUE 
Chooses: CAP 




Stage 2  Sees: CAP,VALUE 
Chooses: BID (≤ 
CAP) 
 Sees: CAP,VALUE 
Chooses: BID (≤ 
CAP) 
 
Earnings in a Period 
When your team obtains the good at the end of a period (if your BID is the highest), 
then you will receive your VALUE for the good and will pay the opposing team’s BID. If your 
team does not obtain the good, you do not receive or pay any amount. In other words, your 
earnings in the current period are: 
Earnings = Your VALUE – Your Opponent’s BID       (If you obtained the auctioned good); 
 
Earnings = 0             (If you did not obtain the auctioned good). 
 
Recall that a Type B subject’s value is 2.5 times more than her Type A teammate. Moreover, at 
the time of decision making, each Type B subject knows her value. However, Type A subjects only 
know their maximum possible value but not their actual value. 
 
Sequence of Auctions: 
 When the current period is over, the next period will start. Each period, you will be 
randomly matched with a new teammate and participate in a new auction with a different 





Below, there is an example of how Type A’s and Type B’s screens may look.  
If you are a Type A subject, you see your MAX VALUE. Remember that this is the highest 
amount your actual value can be. You DON’T know your actual value before the auction is over. 










If you are a Type B subject, you see your value for the good and the CAP that your Type 
A teammate decided on. After observing your value, you will enter your BID in the text box on 











The screen below shows the information that a Type A person will see at the conclusion 
of a period. It displays Type A’s MAX VALUE, VALUE and CAP. Then it shows the BID that the 
Type B teammate decided on. It will also give you the BID of your opponent team and calculates 
the winner, the price of the good and your payoff for the round. Note that much of the 











The next screen shows the information that a Type B person will see at the conclusion of 
a period. It displays Type B’s VALUE, CAP and BID. It will also give you the BID of your opponent 
team and calculates the winner, the price of the good and your payoff for the round. Again, 





The tables below indicate all the MAX VALUEs, VALUEs and BIDs in an auction, and show 
the results for three different choices of a CAP. Recall that in the experiment Type A subjects will 
observe only their own MAX VALUEs and Type B subjects will observe their own VALUES. No 
subject will know the values received by the opponent team. 
1. 
 Team 1 
 (YOU) 
Team 2 
Type A’s MAX VALUE (observed by Type A) 84.62 37.40 
Type A’s VALUE 56.40 8.08 
Type A’s CAP 12.00 20.50 
Type B’s VALUE 141.00 20.20 
Type B’s BID 12.00 12.03 
Received Item No Yes 
Price N/A 12.00 
Type A’s Payoff 0 -3.92 
Type B’s Payoff 0 8.20 
2. 
 Team 1 
 (YOU) 
Team 2 
Type A’s MAX VALUE (observed by Type A) 84.62 37.40 
Type A’s VALUE 56.40 8.08 
Type A’s CAP 36.00 20.50 
Type B’s VALUE 141.00 20.20 
Type B’s BID 36.00 12.03 
Received Item Yes No 
Price 12.03 N/A 
Type A’s Payoff 44.37 0 






 Team 1 
 (YOU) 
Team 2 
Type A’s MAX VALUE (observed by Type A) 84.62 37.40 
Type A’s VALUE 56.40 8.08 
Type A’s CAP 70.00 20.50 
Type B’s VALUE 141.00 20.20 
Type B’s BID 59.44 12.03 
Received Item Yes No 
Price 12.03 N/A 
Type A’s Payoff 44.37 0 
Type B’s Payoff 128.97 0 
 
In all of the examples above, Type A of Team 2 (your opponent) observes a MAX VALUE 
of 37.40 and she decides on a CAP of 20.50. Team 2’s BID is 12.03.  
Type A of Team 1 observes a MAX VALUE of 84.62.  Her true value (which she does not 
know at the time of decision making), is 56.40. Therefore, the value of the Type B subject of 
Team 1 is 141 (2.5x56.40=141).  
Each of the three tables corresponds to different choices of CAP and BID for Team 1. In 
the first table, Type A chose a cap of 12.00 and Type B chose a BID of 12.00. 
In the first example the BIDs of two teams are 12.00 and 12.03. Since the highest bid 
(12.03) is submitted by Team 2, Team 2 obtains the good and pays its Opponent’s BID (12.00). In 
this period, the subjects in Team 1 earn zero, Type A of Team 2 earns 8.08 – 12.00 = -3.92 ECU, 
and Type B of Team 2 earns 20.20-12.00=8.20. Note that Type A of Team 2 loses money in this 
period because her Type B teammate is allowed to submit a bid that is higher than the Type A’s 
true value.  
In the second example, everything is the same except Type A of Team 1 choses a higher 
CAP (36.00) and Type B chooses a higher BID (36.00). Now Team 1 receives the item. The price is 
equal to the Opponent’s (Team 2’s) BID (12.03), so Type A of Team 1’s payoff is 56.40 – 12.03 = 
44.37 ECU and Type B of Team 1’s payoff is 141.00-12.03 = 128.97 ECU. 
In the third example, Type A of Team 1’s CAP is now 70.00, and Type B’s BID is now 
59.44. The BIDs are 59.03 and 12.03. Team 1 receives the item for a price of 12.03, Type A’s 





At the beginning of today’s session both Type A and Type B subjects will receive an 
endowment of $8. The endowment is provided in order to cover any losses that you may make. 
Every period your earnings from that period are added to your initial endowment. At the end of 
today’s session you will receive your cumulative earnings —your earnings from 25 auctions plus 
your initial endowment. The conversion rates are $1 = 20 ECU for Type A and $1 = 80 ECU for 
Type B.  In addition to this sum, you will be paid a $7 participation fee. 
Are there any questions? 
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Practice Questions: Please answer the questions below. The experiment will start after 
everybody answers all the questions correctly. Please feel free to ask questions. 
1. Suppose a Type A subject observes a MAX VALUE of 76.00ECU. What is her possible VALUE?  
a) any value from 0 to 100.00  
b) any value from 0 to 76.00 
c) any value from 0 to 76.00 but not 76.00 
d) any value from 0 to 100.00 but not 76.00 
 
2. Suppose a Type A subject entered 21.00 as the CAP. What are the possible BIDs that the Type 
B subject in her team can select? 
a) Any BID is possible. 
b) Any BID that is between 0 and Type B’s VALUE is possible. 
c) Any BID that is between 0 and Type A’s VALUE is possible. 
d) Any BID that is between 0 and the CAP is possible. 
 
3. Fill the table below 
 Team 1 Team 2 
MAX VALUE (observed by Type A) 43.00 37.40 
Type A’s VALUE 4.00 10 
Type A’s CAP 38.00 21.00 
Type B’s VALUE   
Type B’s BID 6.00 8.00 
Received Item   
Price   
Type A’s Payoff   






INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRST-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTIONS (computerized bidders) 
Thank you for being part of our research. Various research foundations have provided 
funds for this research. This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and, if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn 
a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
All values in the experiment will be in terms of Experimental Currency Unit (ECU). At the 
end of the experiment, we will convert your total earnings in the session to US$.  
• In this experiment, we will run a sequence of auctions in which you will act as the buyer of a 
fictitious good. There will be 5 practice periods and 25 real periods. You will be paid only for 
the real periods. 
• A single good will be auctioned off in each period. 
• In each period, a computerized bidder will bid on behalf of you in the auction. We will tell 
you the bidding rule of the computerized bidder later in these instructions 
• If you do not limit your computerized bidder, it will place an UNCONSTRAINED BID which 
may be higher than the amount you would like it to bid. 
• Your task will be to determine a CAP, which is the maximum amount that you allow your 
computerized bidder to bid. 
• The computerized bidder’s ACTUAL BID is the lesser of its UNCONSTRAINED BID and the 
CAP. 
Matching in Each Period 
In each period, you will be randomly matched with another person in this room. You 
and that person will participate in the auction. You will never know who the other person is in 
your auction. You will not be matched with the same person in any two consecutive periods.  
Values  
At the beginning of each period, each person participating in the auction privately 
observes her maximum possible value (MAX VALUE) for the auctioned good. Your MAX VALUE is 
a number randomly selected from the interval [0,100] and rounded to the nearest cent. Each 
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number is equally likely. Your MAX VALUE and the MAX VALUE of the other person who 
participates in the same auction with you are independently determined.  
Your VALUE for the good is the amount of ECU the experimenter will give you if you 
receive the item at the end of the period. You do not know your exact VALUE for the good at the 
time of decision making.  All you know is that your VALUE is a number contained in the interval 
[0, MAX VALUE]. Therefore, your VALUE is at minimum zero and cannot exceed your MAX 
VALUE. Again, any number between 0 and your MAX VALUE is equally likely.  For example, let’s 
say you receive a MAX VALUE of 45.32. Then your VALUE is uniformly distributed on interval [0, 
45.32] and it can be any number less than or equal to 45.32. Let’s say your VALUE is 21.00. This 
means that if you get the good at the end of the period, you will receive 21.00 ECU from us. 
To reiterate, MAX VALUE is never higher than 100 and a VALUE is never higher than the 
corresponding MAX VALUE. Each person in an auction receives independent MAX VALUEs and 
independent VALUEs. Hence, your VALUE and MAX VALUE are most likely different from your 
opponent’s VALUE and MAX VALUE. 
Auction  
• Two persons participate in each auction. Each person is represented by a computerized 
bidder. 
• You observe your MAX VALUE for the current period. Your computerized bidder observes 
your true VALUE for the good.  
• After observing your MAX VALUE for the period, you need to decide the maximum amount 
that you will allow the computerized bidder to bid on your behalf. We call this amount your 
“CAP”.  
• You have been given two sheets explaining the bidding rule of your computerized bidder for 
each possible VALUE (unless you restrict it by a CAP). These two sheets provide you with the 
same information in two formats: one is a table, and one is a graph. The bids on the sheets 
are referred to as the computerized bidder’s UNCONSTRAINED BID. Please take a look at 
these sheets and confirm that when your VALUE is, for example, 22.00 ECU, the 
UNCONSTRAINED BID will be 44.00. 





ACTUAL BID = minimum {UNCONSTRAINED BID , CAP}  
 
• After both your and the other player’s ACTUAL BIDs are submitted, the one who has the 
highest ACTUAL BID obtains the good and pays her ACTUAL BID. In case of a tie, each of the 
two participants in the auction will receive the good with equal probabilities.  
• This is the end of the period. 
 
Earnings in a Period 
If you obtain the good at the end of the period (if your ACTUAL BID is the highest), then 
you will receive your VALUE for the good and you will pay your ACTUAL BID. If you did not 
obtain the good, you do not receive or pay any amount. In other words, your earnings in the 
current period are: 
Earnings = Your VALUE – Your ACTUAL BID       (If you obtained the auctioned good); 
 
Earnings = 0             (If you did not obtain the auctioned good). 
 
 When the current period is over, the next period will start. Each period, you will be 
randomly matched with a new player and receive a new MAX VALUE. Therefore, your VALUE of 






Below, there is an example of how your screen may look. On top of your screen there is an 
interactive tool. The tool shows your MAX VALUE for the current period. Remember that your 
VALUE can be any number between zero and your MAX VALUE, but you do not know what it is. 
However, your computerized bidder knows your VALUE and bases its UNCONSTRAINED BID on 
your VALUE. By sliding the little black square between zero and your MAX VALUE, you may see 
the UNCONSTRAINED BID of your computerized bidder for the corresponding VALUE. This tool 
provides you with the exact same information as you may learn from the UNCONSTRAINED BID 
table or graph that we have provided to you. Please use whichever tool that you prefer in order 
to understand how the computerized bidder bids unless it is restricted by a CAP. 
You need to enter your bidder’s CAP for this period in the text box on your screen and click on 
SUBMIT. Remember that your ACTUAL BID will be what your computerized bidder’s 
UNCONSTRAINED BID is unless you restrict it by a CAP, in which case it will be the lesser of the 




The screen below is an example of the results screen after the conclusion of one 
auction. It displays your true VALUE, the UNCONSTRAINED BID that corresponds to that value, 
and the ACTUAL BID. It will also give you the ACTUAL BID of your opponent and calculate the 
winner, the price of the item and your payoff for the round. Note that much of the information 






The tables below indicate all the MAX VALUEs, VALUEs and UNCONSTRAINED BIDs in an 
auction, and show the results for three different choices of a CAP. Recall that in the experiment 
you will only observe your own MAX VALUE and will only know that your VALUE is not higher 
than your MAX VALUE. You will not know the MAX VALUE or VALUE of the other player. 
 Player 1 
 (YOU) 
Player 2 
MAX VALUE 84.62 37.40 
VALUE 56.40 8.08 
UNCONSTRAINED BID 59.44 9.03 
CAP 5.00 20.50 
ACTUAL BID 5.00 9.03 
Received Item No Yes 
Price N/A 9.03 
Payoff 0 -0.95 
  
 Player 1 
 (YOU) 
Player 2 
MAX VALUE 84.62 37.40 
VALUE 56.40 8.08 
UNCONSTRAINED BID 59.44 9.03 
CAP 36.00 20.50 
ACTUAL BID 36.00 9.03 
Received Item Yes No 
Price 36.00 N/A 
Payoff 20.40 0 
 
 Player 1 
 (YOU) 
Player 2 
MAX VALUE 84.62 37.40 
VALUE 56.40 8.08 
UNCONSTRAINED BID 59.44 9.03 
CAP 70.00 20.50 
ACTUAL BID 59.44 9.03 
Received Item Yes No 
Price 59.44 N/A 




In all of the examples above, Player 2 (your opponent) observes a MAX VALUE of 37.40 
and she decides on a CAP of 20.50. Player 2’s VALUE is 8.08 and therefore, her computerized 
bidder’s UNCONSTRAINED BID is 9.03. However, since 20.50 > 9.03, the ACTUAL BID of Player 2 
is her UNCONSTRAINED BID. 
Player 1 observes a MAX VALUE of 84.62. Each of the three tables corresponds to a 
different choice of CAP that Player 1 might have chosen. Player 1’s private VALUE is 56.40 (she 
does not observe this at the time of deciding on the CAP but her computerized bidder knows the 
VALUE). In the first table, Player 1 chose a cap of 5.00. If you check the provided bidding sheet, 
you will see that Player 1’s computerized bidder’s UNCONSTRAINED BID is 59.44. Since 5.00 < 
59.44, the ACTUAL BID is 5.00. 
In the first example the ACTUAL BIDs are 5.00 and 9.03. Since the highest bid (9.03) is 
submitted by Player 2, Player 2 obtains the good and pays her ACTUAL BID (9.03). In this period, 
Player 1 earns zero and Player 2 earns 8.08 – 9.03 = -0.95 ECU. Note that Player 2 loses money in 
this period because the bidder is unconstrained and allowed to submit a bid that is higher than 
the true value.  
In the second example, everything is the same except Player 1 chose a higher CAP 
(36.00). Now the ACTUAL BIDs are 36.00 and 9.03 and Player 1 receives the item. The price is 
equal to her ACTUAL BID (36.00), so Player 1’s payoff is 56.40 – 36.00 = 20.40 ECU. 
In the third example, Player 1’s CAP is now 70.00. The ACTUAL BIDs are now 59.03 and 
9.03. Player 1 receives the item for a price of 59.03, so her payoff is 56.40 – 59.03 = -2.96 ECU. 
  
Total Payoffs 
At the beginning of today’s session you will receive an endowment of 160 ECU which is 
provided in order to cover any losses that you may make. Every period your earnings from that 
period are added to your initial endowment. At the end of today’s session you will receive your 
cumulative earnings —your earnings from 25 auctions plus your initial endowment. The 
conversion rate from ECU to dollars is $1 = 20 ECU.  In addition to this sum, you will be paid a $7 
participation fee. 




Please answer the questions below. The experiment will start after everybody answers 
all the questions correctly. Please feel free to ask questions. 
 
1. Suppose your MAX VALUE is 76.00ECU. What is your possible VALUE?  
a) any value from 0 to 100.00  
b) any value from 0 to 76.00 
c) any value from 0 to 76.00 but not 76.00 
d) any value from 0 to 100.00 but not 76.00 
 
2. Suppose your MAX VALUE is 76.00 and you entered 21.00 as your CAP. Your computerized 






3. Suppose your MAX VALUE is 43.00 and you entered 38.00 as your CAP. Your computerized 






4. Suppose Player 1’s ACTUAL BID is 26.15 and Player 2’s ACTUAL BID is 63.00. Who will obtain 
the good and what price the winner will pay? 
a) Player 1 wins and pays 26.15 
b) Player 1 wins and pays 63.00 
c) Player 2 wins and pays 63.00 




5. Suppose Player 1’s ACTUAL BID is 31.00 and Player 2’s ACTUAL BID is 24.00. Player 1’s VALUE 
for the good was 38, and Player 2’s VALUE was 46. What will be the earnings of each player from 
this period. 
a) Player 1 earns 7, Player 2 earns zero. 
b) Player 1 earns 7, Player 2 earns 22. 
c) Player 1 earns 14, Player 2 earns zero. 





INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTIONS (computerized bidders) 
Thank you for being part of our research. Various research foundations have provided 
funds for this research. This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and, if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn 
a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
All values in the experiment will be in terms of Experimental Currency Unit (ECU). At the 
end of the experiment, we will convert your total earnings in the session to US$.  
• In this experiment, we will run a sequence of auctions in which you will act as the buyer of a 
fictitious good. There will be 5 practice periods and 25 real periods. You will be paid only for 
the real periods. 
• A single good will be auctioned off in each period. 
• In each period, a computerized bidder will bid on behalf of you in the auction. We will tell 
you the bidding rule of the computerized bidder later in these instructions 
• If you do not limit your computerized bidder, it will place an UNCONSTRAINED BID which 
may be higher than the amount you would like it to bid. 
• Your task will be to determine a CAP, which is the maximum amount that you allow your 
computerized bidder to bid. 
• The computerized bidder’s ACTUAL BID is the lesser of its UNCONSTRAINED BID and the 
CAP. 
Matching in Each Period 
In each period, you will be randomly matched with another person in this room. You 
and that person will participate in the auction. You will never know who the other person is in 
your auction. You will not be matched with the same person in any two consecutive periods.  
Values  
At the beginning of each period, each person participating in the auction privately 
observes her maximum possible value (MAX VALUE) for the auctioned good. Your MAX VALUE is 
a number randomly selected from the interval [0,100] and rounded to the nearest cent. Each 
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number is equally likely. Your MAX VALUE and the MAX VALUE of the other person who 
participates in the same auction with you are independently determined.  
Your VALUE for the good is the amount of ECU the experimenter will give you if you 
receive the item at the end of the period. You do not know your exact VALUE for the good at the 
time of decision making.  All you know is that your VALUE is a number contained in the interval 
[0, MAX VALUE]. Therefore, your VALUE is at minimum zero and cannot exceed your MAX 
VALUE. Again, any number between 0 and your MAX VALUE is equally likely.  For example, let’s 
say you receive a MAX VALUE of 45.32. Then your VALUE is uniformly distributed on interval [0, 
45.32] and it can be any number less than or equal to 45.32. Let’s say your VALUE is 21.00. This 
means that if you get the good at the end of the period, you will receive 21.00 ECU from us. 
To reiterate, MAX VALUE is never higher than 100 and a VALUE is never higher than the 
corresponding MAX VALUE. Each person in an auction receives independent MAX VALUEs and 
independent VALUEs. Hence, your VALUE and MAX VALUE are most likely different from your 
opponent’s VALUE and MAX VALUE. 
Auction  
• Two persons participate in each auction. Each person is represented by a computerized 
bidder. 
• You observe your MAX VALUE for the current period. Your computerized bidder observes 
your true VALUE for the good.  
• After observing your MAX VALUE for the period, you need to decide the maximum amount 
that you will allow the computerized bidder to bid on your behalf. We call this amount your 
“CAP”.  
• You have been given two sheets explaining the bidding rule of your computerized bidder for 
each possible VALUE (unless you restrict it by a CAP). These two sheets provide you with the 
same information in two formats: one is a table, and one is a graph. The bids on the sheets 
are referred to as the computerized bidder’s UNCONSTRAINED BID. Please take a look at 
these sheets and confirm that when your VALUE is, for example, 22.00 ECU, the 
UNCONSTRAINED BID will be 55.00. 
• The computerized bidder’s ACTUAL BID is the lesser of its UNCONSTRAINED BID and the 
CAP: 




• After both your and the other player’s ACTUAL BIDs are submitted, the one who has the 
highest ACTUAL BID obtains the good and pays her opponent’s ACTUAL BID. In case of a 
tie, each of the two participants in the auction will receive the good with equal probabilities.  
• This is the end of the period. 
 
Earnings in a Period 
If you obtain the good at the end of the period (if your ACTUAL BID is the highest), then 
you will receive your VALUE for the good and you will pay your opponent’s ACTUAL BID. If you 
did not obtain the good, you do not receive or pay any amount. In other words, your earnings in 
the current period are: 
Earnings = Your VALUE – Opponent’s ACTUAL BID       (If you obtained the auctioned 
good); 
 
Earnings = 0             (If you did not obtain the auctioned good). 
 
 When the current period is over, the next period will start. Each period, you will be 
randomly matched with a new player and receive a new MAX VALUE. Therefore, your VALUE of 






Below, there is an example of how your screen may look. On top of your screen there is 
an interactive tool. The tool shows your MAX VALUE for the current period. Remember that 
your VALUE can be any number between zero and your MAX VALUE, but you do not know what 
it is. However, your computerized bidder knows your VALUE and bases its UNCONSTRAINED BID 
on your VALUE. By sliding the little black square between zero and your MAX VALUE, you may 
see the UNCONSTRAINED BID of your computerized bidder for the corresponding VALUE. This 
tool provides you with the exact same information as you may learn from the UNCONSTRAINED 
BID table or graph that we have provided to you. Please use whichever tool that you prefer in 
order to understand how the computerized bidder bids unless it is restricted by a CAP. 
You need to enter your bidder’s CAP for this period in the text box on your screen and 
click on SUBMIT. Remember that your ACTUAL BID will be what your computerized bidder’s 
UNCONSTRAINED BID is unless you restrict it by a CAP, in which case it will be the lesser of the 




The screen below is an example of the results screen after the conclusion of one 
auction. It displays your true VALUE, the UNCONSTRAINED BID that corresponds to that value, 
and the ACTUAL BID. It will also give you the ACTUAL BID of your opponent and calculate the 
winner, the price of the item and your payoff for the round. Note that much of the information 






The tables below indicate all the MAX VALUEs, VALUEs and UNCONSTRAINED BIDs in an 
auction, and show the results for three different choices of a CAP. Recall that in the experiment 
you will only observe your own MAX VALUE and will only know that your VALUE is not higher 
than your MAX VALUE. You will not know the MAX VALUE or VALUE of the other player. 
 Player 1 
 (YOU) 
Player 2 
MAX VALUE 84.62 37.40 
VALUE 56.40 8.08 
UNCONSTRAINED BID 141.00 20.20 
CAP 10.00 24.50 
ACTUAL BID 10.00 20.20 
Received Item No Yes 
Price N/A 10.00 
Payoff 0 -1.92 
  
 Player 1 
 (YOU) 
Player 2 
MAX VALUE 84.62 37.40 
VALUE 56.40 8.08 
UNCONSTRAINED BID 141.00 20.20 
CAP 48.10 24.50 
ACTUAL BID 48.10 20.20 
Received Item Yes No 
Price 20.20 N/A 
Payoff 36.20 0 
 
 Player 1 
 (YOU) 
Player 2 
MAX VALUE 84.62 37.40 
VALUE 56.40 8.08 
UNCONSTRAINED BID 141.00 20.20 
CAP 90.00 24.50 
ACTUAL BID 90.00 20.20 
Received Item Yes No 
Price 20.20 N/A 




In all of the examples above, Player 2 (your opponent) observes a MAX VALUE of 37.40 
and she decides on a CAP of 24.50. Player 2’s VALUE is 8.08 and therefore, her computerized 
bidder’s UNCONSTRAINED BID is 20.20. However, since 24.50 > 20.20, the ACTUAL BID of Player 
2 is her UNCONSTRAINED BID. 
Player 1 observes a MAX VALUE of 84.62. Each of the three tables corresponds to a 
different choice of CAP that Player 1 might have chosen. Player 1’s private VALUE is 56.40 (she 
does not observe this at the time of deciding on the CAP but her computerized bidder knows the 
VALUE). In the first table, Player 1 chose a cap of 10.00. If you check the provided bidding sheet, 
you will see that Player 1’s computerized bidder’s UNCONSTRAINED BID is 141.00. Since 10.00 < 
141.00, the ACTUAL BID is 10.00. 
In the first example the ACTUAL BIDs are 10.00 and 20.20. Since the highest bid (20.20) 
is submitted by Player 2, Player 2 obtains the good and pays her opponent’s ACTUAL BID 
(10.00). In this period, Player 1 earns zero and Player 2 earns 8.08 – 10.00 = -1.92 ECU. Note that 
Player 2 loses money in this period because the bidder is unconstrained and allowed to submit a 
bid that is higher than the true value.  
In the second example, everything is the same except Player 1 chose a higher CAP 
(48.10). Now the ACTUAL BIDs are 48.10 and 20.20 and Player 1 receives the item. The price is 
equal to her opponent’s ACTUAL BID (20.20), so Player 1’s payoff is 56.40 – 20.20 = 36.20 ECU. 
In the third example, Player 1’s CAP is now 90.00. The ACTUAL BIDs are now 90.00 and 
20.20. Player 1 receives the item for a price of 20.20, so her payoff is 56.40 – 20.20 = 36.20 ECU. 
  
Total Payoffs 
At the beginning of today’s session you will receive an endowment of 160 ECU which is 
provided in order to cover any losses that you may make. Every period your earnings from that 
period are added to your initial endowment. At the end of today’s session you will receive your 
cumulative earnings —your earnings from 25 auctions plus your initial endowment. The 
conversion rate from ECU to dollars is $1 = 20 ECU.  In addition to this sum, you will be paid a $7 
participation fee. 




Please answer the questions below. The experiment will start after everybody answers 
all the questions correctly. Please feel free to ask questions. 
 
1. Suppose your MAX VALUE is 76.00ECU. What is your possible VALUE?  
a) any value from 0 to 100.00  
b) any value from 0 to 76.00 
c) any value from 0 to 76.00 but not 76.00 
d) any value from 0 to 100.00 but not 76.00 
 
2. Suppose your MAX VALUE is 76.00 and you entered 21.00 as your CAP. Your computerized 






3. Suppose your MAX VALUE is 43.00 and you entered 38.00 as your CAP. Your computerized 






4. Suppose Player 1’s ACTUAL BID is 26.15 and Player 2’s ACTUAL BID is 63.00. Who will obtain 
the good and what price the winner will pay? 
a) Player 1 wins and pays 26.15 
b) Player 1 wins and pays 63.00 
c) Player 2 wins and pays 63.00 




5. Suppose Player 1’s ACTUAL BID is 31.00 and Player 2’s ACTUAL BID is 24.00. Player 1’s VALUE 
for the good was 38, and Player 2’s VALUE was 46. What will be the earnings of each player from 
this period. 
a) Player 1 earns 7, Player 2 earns zero. 
b) Player 1 earns 7, Player 2 earns 22. 
c) Player 1 earns 14, Player 2 earns zero. 




B. CHAPTER FOUR SUPPORTING MATERIALS
This appendix contains proofs of two of the propositions in Chapter 4.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that the firms adopt the strategy described in
the statement of the proposition. First note that from assumptions A2 and A3 and
because the cost parameters are identically distributed, bA(c) = bB(c). So if the
bidders follow this strategy the two highest bids will correspond to the two lowest
draws from F (c). Now consider the problem of an A bidder who submits a bid z
when the other bidders follow the prescribed strategies (the problem is symmetric
for a B bidder). Since the lowest of the opposing cost draws determine the bidder’s









first event occurs with probability N−1
2N−1 (because there are N − 1 out of 2N − 1
permutations of the bidders where an opposing A receives the lowest cost and each
permutation is equally likely), while the second occurs with probability N
2N−1 . This
implies that an A bidder’s expected valuation conditional on winning is given by
bA(c). The important point is that this expected valuation conditional on winning
is completely determined by the behavior of the opposing bidders and the bidders
cost (not his report). The proposition then follows from the standard Vickrey logic.
There cannot be another symmetric equilibrium. Suppose there were and
consider the problem of a given A bidder. If the other bidders use a symmetric
strategy then by the argument above the bidder’s expected value conditional on
winning is still bA(c), so in any proposed symmetric equilibrium the bidder can
improve his payoff by bidding bA(c).
Proof of Proposition 2: Optimality of the second round strategies is obvious, be-
cause in the second round the auction corresponds to a second price auction for a
single good with independent private values.
In the definitions of the events E1(cA), E2(cA), E3(cA), E4(cA), E5(cA), I show
all the possible orderings of profit functions conditional on cA being the second
lowest cost signal. Now consider the problem of an A bidder in the first round (the
argument for a B bidder is analogous) facing opposing bidders using a symmetric
increasing strategy. The highest of the opponent’s bid then corresponds to the lowest
of the opponents’ cost signals. So in E1(cA), for example, an opposing A has the
highest opposing bid in the first round.
The bidding strategy described in the statement of the proposition is then a
bidder’s expected payment conditional on losing in the first round (in equilibrium)
and winning in the second round. Note that this is not exactly correct as in E3 the
bidder also loses in the second round, but losing gives the same payoff as winning
and paying one’s full value.
The key observation in the proof is that if the opponents all follow a symmetric
strategy in the first round, then bid their (known) value in the second round, an
A bidder’s expected payment conditional on advancing to the second round and
136
winning in that round is not affected by his bid in the first round (because the
ordering of the signals does not change). This expected second round payment then
determines his willingness to pay in the first round.
Suppose that the bidder bids above his expected payment and wins in the first
round when the realizations were such that he would have won in equilibrium in the
second round. In the event that z > bA(c
(1)
A ) > bA(cA) or z > bB(c
(1)
B ) > bA(cA), he
has to pay an amount above bA(cA) in the first round when he could have increased
his expected payoff by waiting until the second round (expecting to pay bA(cA)).
Lowering his bid in the first round would have no impact on his payoff in this case.
If the realizations were such that the bidder wins in the first round, then
raising his bid has no effect on his expected payoff. If he lowers his bid and loses
to some bid bA(c
(1)
A ) (the argument is the same if he lost to bB(c
(2)
B )), then he can
infer that his expected payment in the second payment in the second round is (by
symmetry of the bidders’ expectations) bA(c
(1)
A ), so that he could have received the
same expected payment by following equilibrium and winning in the first round.
If the realized signals were such that the bidder does not win in either round,
the bidder would expect a negative payoff by bidding above bA(cA) in the first round
and winning because the price would necessarily be greater than bA(cA) and from
this the bidder could infer that the expected price in the second round is at least as
high as the bidder’s actual value in expectation. Obviously, lowering the bid has no
effect on the payoff in this case.
137
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jorge Aseff and Hector Chade. An optimal auction with identity-dependent exter-
nalities. In Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings, 2004.
Susan Athey. Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria
in games of incomplete information. Econometrica, 69(4):861–890, 2001.
Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna. Multiple-object auctions with budget con-
strained bidders. Review of Economic Studies, 68(1):155–179, January 2001.
Isabelle Brocas. Auctions with type-dependent and negative externalities: The
optimal mechanism. Technical report, Working Paper, University of Southern
California, 2007.
Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe Lopomo. Budget constraints and demand reduction
in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions. Journal of Industrial Economics, 56(1):
113–142, March 2008.
Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan D. Levin, and Paul R. Milgrom. Winning play in spectrum
auctions. Working Paper 14756, National Bureau of Economic Research, March
2009.
Justin Burkett. Endogenous budget constraints in auctions. Unpublished, December
2011.
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale. Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first price
sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints. Economics Letters, 50(3):373–379,
1996.
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale. Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders.
Review of Economic Studies, 65(1):1–21, 1998.
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale. Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer:
The 2x2 case. European Economic Review, 43:947–957, 1999.
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale. The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-
constrained buyer. Journal of Economic Theory, 92(2):198–233, 2000.
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale. Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have
arbitrary types. Theoretical Economics, 1(1):95–118, 2006.
James C. Cox, Bruce Roberson, and Vernon L. Smith. Theory and behavior of single
object auctions. In Vernon L. Smith, editor, Research in Experimental Economics,
volume 2, pages 1–43. JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn., 1982.
James C. Cox, Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker. Theory and individual
behavior of first-price auctions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1(1):61–99,
March 1988.
Peter C. Cramton. Money out of thin air: The nationwide narrowband PCS auction.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 4(2):267–343, June 1995.
Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri. Level-k auctions: Can a nonequilibrium
model of strategic thinking explain the winner’s curse and overbidding in private
value auctions? Econometrica, 75(6):1721–1770, 2007.
Gopal Das Varma. Standard auctions with identity dependent externalities. Rand
Journal of Economics, 33:689–708, 2002a.
Gopal Das Varma. Who else is bidding? the pareto optimality of disclosing bidder
identities. Review of Economic Design, 7:155–171, 2002b.
Gopal Das Varma and Giuseppe Lopomo. Non-cooperative entry deterrence in
license auctions: Dynamic versus sealed bid. The Journal of Industrial Economics,
LVII(2):450–476, 2010.
Mauricio R. Delgado, Andrew Schotter, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Elizabeth A. Phelps.
Understanding overbidding: Using the neutral circuitry of reward to design eco-
nomic auctions. Science, 321:1849–1852, 2008.
Hanming Fang and Sergio Perreiras. Equilibrium of affiliated value second price
auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case. Games and
Economic Behavior, 39:215–236, 2002.
Hanming Fang and Sergio Perreiras. On the failure of the linkage principle with
financially constrained bidders. Journal of Economic Theory, 110:374–392, 2003.
Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer. Coordination and lock-in: Competition with
switching costs and network effects. In Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter,
editors, Handbook of Industrial Organization, volume 3, chapter 31. Elsevier B.V.,
2007.
Chaim Fershtman and Kenneth L. Judd. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 77(5):927–940, December 1987.
Nicols Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta. The role of optimal threats in auction design.
Journal of Economic Theory, 144(2):884–897, 2009.
Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Erkut Ozbay. Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory and
experiment. American Economic Review, 97(4):1407–1418, 2007.
139
Urs Fischbacher. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Experimental Economics, 10(2):171–178, 2007.
Ian L. Gale and Mark Stegeman. Sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects.
Games and Economic Behavior, 36:74–103, 2001.
Richard J. Gilbert and David M. G. Newberry. Preemptive patenting and the
persistence of monopoly. American Economic Review, 72(3):514–526, June 1982.
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, and Thomas R. Palfrey. Quantal response equi-
librium and overbidding in private value auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,
104:247–272, 2002.
I.E. Hafalir, R. Ravi, and A. Sayedi. A near pareto optimal auction with budget
constraints. Games and Economic Behavior, 74:699–708, 2012. Forthcoming.
Charles E. Hyde and James A. Vercammen. Credit contracting and bidding under
wealth constraints. Economic Theory, 20:703–732, 2002.
Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu. Efficient design with interdependent valua-
tions. Econometrica, 69(5):1237–1259, 2001.
Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu. Allocative and information externalities
in auctions and related mechanims. In Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey,
and Torsten Persson, editors, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory
and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Volume 1, pages 102–135. Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu, and Ennio Stacchetti. Multidimensional mech-
anism design for auctions with externalities. Journal of Economic Theory, 85:
814–829, 1999.
Michael C. Jensen. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers.
American Economic Review, 76(2):323–329, 1986.
John H. Kagel. Auctions: A survey of experimental research. In John H. Kagel
and Alvin E. Roth, editors, The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1995.
Samuel Karlin and Yosef Rinott. Classes of orderings of measures and related cor-
relation inequalities. i. multivariate totally positive distributions. Journal of Mul-
tivariate Analysis, 10:467–498, 1980.
Georgios Katsenos. Simultaneous and sequential auctions of oligopoly licenses. Un-
published, October 2008.
Paul Klemperer. Competition when consumers have switching costs: An overview
with applications to industrial organization, macroeconomics, and international
trade. Review of Economic Studies, 62:515–539, 1995.
140
Paul D. Klemperer. Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press,
2004.
Maciej H. Kotowski. First-price auctions with budget constraints. Unpublished,
November 2010.
Maciej H. Kotowski and Fei Li. All-pay auctions with budget constraints. Unpub-
lished, March 2011.
Kala Krishna. Auctions with endogenous valuations: The persistence of monopoly
revisted. American Economic Review, 83:147–160, 1993.
Vijay Krishna. Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2002.
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jacques Robert. Optimal auctions with financially con-
strained buyers. Economics Letters, 52:181–186, 1996.
A. Malakhov and R.V. Vohra. Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget con-
strained bidders. Review of Economic Design, 12(4):245–257, 2008.
Eric Maskin and John Riley. Asymmetric auctions. Review of Economic Studies,
67:413–438, 2000.
Eric S. Maskin. Auctions and privatization. In George Yarrow and Piotr Jasinski,
editors, Privatization: critical perspectives on the world economy, pages 433–453.
Routledge, 1996.
Eric S. Maskin. Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with
liquidity-constrained buyers. European Economic Review, 44:667–681, 2000.
Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.
Econometrica, 50:1089–1122, 1982.
Roger B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research,
6(1):58–73, February 1981.
Mallesh M. Pai and Rakesh Vohra. Optimal auctions with financially constrained
bidders. Unpublished, August 2008.
Philip J. Reny. On the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in bayesian
games. Econometrica, 79(2):499–553, 2011.
Rhodes-Kropf and S. Viswanathan. Financing auction bids. RAND Journal of
Economics, 36(4):789–815, Winter 2005.
John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson. Optimal auctions. American Economic
Review, 71(3):381–392, June 1981.
Gustavo E. Rodriguez. Auctions of licenses and market structure. Economic Theory,
19:283–309, 2002.
141
David J. Salant. Up in the air: GTE’s experience in the mta auction for personal
communication services licenses. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
6(3):549–572, 1997.
Joseph A. Schumpeter. The Theory of Economic Development. Harvard University
Press, 1934.
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny. A survey of corporate governance. Journal
of Finance, 52(2):737–783, 1997.
William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.
Journal of Finance, 16(1):8–37, March 1961.
Charles Z. Zheng. High bids and broke winners. Journal of Economic Theory, 100:
129–171, 2001.
Charles Z. Zheng. Debt- versus equity-financing in auction designs. Working Paper
10006, Iowa State University, May 2010.
142
